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ARGUMENT 
I. The Parties' Statement of the Facts Highlights the Dispute That Makes Summary 
Judgment Inappropriate in this Case. 
The county's lengthy presentation of the facts (Br. of Appellees at 8-20) lays out a 
history of past concerns regarding slope stability and septic use in Canyon Meadows, and 
then asserts that these facts show the only motivation behind the county's actions was the 
safety of the residents of the area. The landowners' statement of facts (Br. of Appellants 
at 7-18) likewise points to the same history and stresses the fact that these same concerns 
existed for nearly two decades, but the county repeatedly found there was no reason to 
stop issuing building permits, that is until county officials developed animosity towards 
some landowners. The question of whether safety concerns were the real motivation of 
the county, or just a pretext, is exactly the kind of question of fact that should be 
determined by a jury, not by the district court on summary judgment. 
Motive is a question of fact. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint 456 U.S. 273 (1982), 
a racial discrimination claim was filed against an employer's promotion policies. At trial 
no intent to discriminate against race was found. The appellate court reversed, finding 
there was an intent to discriminate. However, the Supreme Court found that the question 
of motive was not a question of law, or even a mixed question of lawr and fact, but was 
purely a question of fact, and found the appellate court erred in substituting its legal 
conclusion for a finding of fact. Id. at 288. Utah courts have long recognized the holding 
articulated in Pullman-Standard. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 
(Utah 1998)(we emphasize that intent is a question of fact); State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, 
834 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(actual motive is not a mixed question of law and fact, but a 
pure question of fact); Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah 
1 
1976)(malicious intent in publishing a statement is a question of fact). Furthermore, in 
the context of a takings claim, the Supreme Court recognized in City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes. Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999), that in a § 1983 claim, the reasonableness of a 
land use decision may need to be submitted to the jury. Id. at 721. (Emphasis added.) 
The narrow question submitted to the jury was whether, when viewed in 
light of the context and the protracted history of the development 
application process, the city's decision to reject a particular development 
plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications. . . . 
Under these circumstances, we hold that it was proper to submit this 
narrow, fact-bound question to the jury. 
In Monterey the court acknowledged that at times governments may present one 
reason to justify its actions when in fact tliere are other motives, and it is appropriate for a 
jury to review extrinsic evidence in making a finding of fact as to the reasonableness of 
the government's proffered justification. "As is often true in § 1983 actions, the disputed 
questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right in acting outside 
the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages. These were 
questions for the jury." Id. at 722. The county goes to great lengths to show what its 
motive was, but that motive has been put into question (Br. of Appellants at 15-18), and 
as such, it was wrong for the district court to grant summary judgment for the county. 
II. Challenges to the Procedural Defects in 97-1 Are Properly Before the Court. 
The county argues that if a specific statute was not cited in the complaint then the 
landowners cannot argue that that statute was violated. This is an argument that has 
appeared several times in this litigation and indeed in this appeal. The landowners have 
filed a separate memorandum in opposition that addresses this argument in detail and 
therefore refers the court to that memorandum for a more detailed discussion of the 
matter. (Add. to Reply Br. at 1-47.) The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure only require 
2 
notice pleadings, and that the facts and causes of actions put the county and the individual 
defendants on notice of the nature of the claim regarding the failure to properly notice the 
hearing on Ordinance 97-1. (R. 554 at 1223-1222, 1220-1219, 1185-1184, 1183, 1179.) 
It is well established that the 14th Amendment requires the states to ensure fan-
procedure is followed. Zinermon v. Burch. 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). This includes 
ensuring that state entities follow and comply with clear statutory procedural 
requirements such as proper notice in the adoption of ordinances. Furthermore, the 
necessity of absolute compliance with the statutory requirements is made perfectly clear 
in Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986).1 In Call the City of West Jordan 
adopted an ordinance without holding a public hearing as required by statute. The court 
explained that there is a difference between a "public hearing" and a "public meeting," 
and found that because the meeting did not comply with the express terms of the statute, 
the ordinance was void ab initio. 
Failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting the 
ordinance renders it invalid. Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133 
(Utah 1975); Anderson at 199. This well established rule is followed by the 
great majority of jurisdictions. Annot, 96 A.L. R.2d 449 (1964); see Town 
of Beverly Shores Plan. Commission v. Enright 463 N.E.2d 246 (Ind.1984) 
(statute required municipality to publish two notices in newspaper within 
ten days of hearing—ordinance invalidated where first notice appeared in 
newspaper eleven days before hearing); Kalakowski v. Clarendon, 139 Vt. 
519, 431 A.2d 478 (1981); Morland Development Co. v. Tulsa.596 P.2d 
1255 (Okla.1979) (city ordinance establishing flood control districts 
invalidated because of failure to follow statutory requirements). We 
therefore hold that the West Jordan, Utah, Ordinance 33, § 9-C-8(2) (1975), 
is invalid and void ab initio. 
]The county refused to address Call v. West Jordon, but the case and an accurate 
summary of its holding were correctly cited. (Br. of Appellants at 37.) The county relied 
on Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004 UT 98, 104 P.3d 1208 to ignore Call, but Carrier 
specifically declined to strike incorrect citations and only applied its holding to assertions 
with no "supporting legal authority." Id. at t1f21, 22. 
3 
In light of this strict compliance rule, the county's arguments fail. First, the Utah 
Code must be read and interpreted as a whole. Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 
80, [^9, 150 P.3d 471 (code is read as a whole and interpretation of its provisions is in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters). The meeting in 
which Ordinance 97-1 was adopted falls well within the definition of a "meeting" 
controlled by the Open Meeting Act codified in U.C.A. § 52-4-2, and is a related statute 
not to be ignored. All public entities, including the county, are required to act openly in a 
public forum, and strict compliance with this code is required. 
Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079, is directly applicable to this 
case. The very statute the county now uses to attack the timing of the landowners' claims 
has been held to be inapplicable because a county does not have any discretion to not 
follow the procedural requirements of the code. In other words, there is no ability by a 
governing body to make a "decision" not to give public notice. Therefore, as improper 
notice is not a "land use decision" under the statute, the 30-day limitation does not bar a 
review of this issue. Id. ^fl|8-9. The county attempts to distinguish Toone because it 
postdates the orders in this case, but the county makes no effort to show how that would 
change the application of a statute that is the same in both cases. 
The county also argues exigent circumstances to excuse its failure to give the 
required public notice, noting the district court's finding that § 52-4-6(5) permitted the 
county to proceed without public notice. However, the plain language of § 52-4-6(5) 
does not support such a ruling (current version at § 52-4-202(5)(emphasis added)): 
When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public body 
to hold an emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent 
nature, the notice requirement of Subsection (2) may be disregarded and the 
4 
best notice practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a public body 
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify all of its members and 
a majority of its members votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting. 
The county meeting on January 13, 1997, was a regular commission meeting that 
was not convened due to any urgency or any unforeseen emergency as contemplated by § 
52-4-6, and the minutes do not reflect that any vote to treat the meetmg as such was 
taken. (Add. to Appellants'Br. at 35.) Indeed the agenda for the meeting acknowledges 
that the January 13th meeting was a "regular public meeting." (Add. to Appellants5 Br. at 
34.) The county makes no effort to explain what unforeseen emergency required it to omit 
any reference to Ordinance 97-1 from the agenda or why no vote was taken to hold the 
meeting despite the lack of notice as required by the statute. The landowners 
acknowledge the intent of the legislature to excuse the need for a "public hearing" when 
adopting a temporary ordinance, but there is no intent in the code to relieve the mandate 
to conduct the public's business in the light of public scrutiny, unless there are urgent, 
unforeseen circumstances, which are not present in this case.2 
Finally, the county argues that because some landowners knew of the meeting on 
January 13, 1997, the issue has been conceded. Utah law requires strict compliance with 
procedural mandates in enacting ordinances, and actual knowledge of one out of many 
interested parties does not absolve the county of its duty to follow those procedures. 
Strict compliance, not substantial compliance, is the standard for these mandatory notice 
requirements. Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 
2The issues the county lists as a basis for its actions have been raised and answered 
many times over nearly two decades. Even if there were new warnings, the first were 
raised in 1994 and the last in July of 1996. (Br. of Appellees at 9-13). Months passed 
before the county took any action. There was no urgent or unforeseen circumstance. 
5 
UT 25, ^ 29; 979 P.2d 332 (application of the substantial compliance doctrine where the 
ordinances at issue are explicitly mandatory contravenes the umnistakable mtent of those 
ordinances); Call 272 P.2d at 183 (discussed in detail supra). 
III. The Only Procedural Requirement Excused under the 1997 Version of $ 17-27-
404 Was That of Holding a Public Hearing. 
The county argues that the legislature intended § 17-27-404 to be read separately 
and in isolation from the rest of Chapter 17-27. It relies on a circular argument that 
because Section 404 does not require a public hearing and Section 402 does, the 
legislature intended the two sections to be read separately. However, if Subsection 404 
was truly intended to be read in isolation from the rest of the chapter (thus eliminating the 
need to expressly exclude the planning commission requirement), then likewise there 
would have been no need to specifically exclude the "public hearing" requirement 
because the requirement for a public hearing is also in a different section of the chapter. 
The legislature saw the need to expressly exclude the public hearing requirement in § 17-
27-404 because it understood and appreciated the well-established rule that statutes are 
read as a whole and are interpreted in harmony with other provisions of the chapter. 
The county also argues that the recent amendment to § 17-27-404 demonstrated 
the past intent of the legislature. This argument is counterintuitive. It is well established 
that the legislature is presumed to have acted advisedly in enacting legislation. W & G 
Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 802 P.2d 755 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). It 
has been understood for years that the enabling acts do not waive the requirement that a 
planning commission recommendation precede the enactment of a moratorium, and if the 
legislature wanted to waive the requirement for a planning commission referral, the 
6 
statute would have to be changed. Utah Zoning Law Proposals for Legislative Change* 9 
BYU J. Pub.L.l(1994) (attached in the addendum to this brief at page 52) stated: 
Should a planning commission recommendation be required before a six-
month "moratorium" is enacted? A local legislative body may enact 
temporary zoning legislation (a moratorium) which prohibits land 
development for up to six months. Such a provision is often used to 
respond to quickly-developing problems, but the enabling ads do not waive 
the requirement that a planning commission recommendation precede the 
enactment of zoning legislation. Indeed, the acts are explicit that an 
amendment to the text or map of a zoning ordinance first requires referral to 
the planning commission. 
The county again argues that the need for immediate action outweighed 
compliance with statutory mandates. As pointed out above, there was no unforeseen 
emergency in this matter that would justify such a finding.3 Under the plain language of 
the statute as it existed in 1997, the only procedural requirement excused by the 
legislature was that of holding a public hearing. As such Ordinances 97-1, 97-6, and 97-
13 were not properly adopted and should be declared illegal and void ab initio. 
IV. The Restriction Placed on the Sale of Property in Canyon Meadows Exceeded the 
Scope of the County's Authority. 
The county erroneously infers that it may exercise an unenumerated power as long 
as the Utah State Legislature has not expressly prohibited the power (Br. of Appellees at 
27, 28.) On the contrary, the state holds the power over land use regulations, and counties 
hold only the powers delegated to them by the state. Under Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-1, the 
legislature only delegated powers that it specified expressly in Title 17, or those 
necessarily implied. "Necessarily implied powers are, by definition, those powers 
3As to Ordinances 97-6 and 97-13, there is absolutely no basis to argue an 
emergency existed as over six months had passed since Ordinance 97-1 was adopted. 
There was more than adequate time for the county to follow the correct procedures. 
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necessary and incident to powers expressly granted." See Provo City v. Ivie, 2004 UT 30 
n.2, 94 P.3d 206 (discussing the analogous powers of municipalities). The county cites 
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 27, to support its argument that the 
court should presume its actions valid using the "reasonably debatable standard." Id. at 
ffi[14, 24. However, the court in Bradley was reviewing the city's denial of a landowner's 
request for a rezone. Id. But the power to rezone is an enumerated power delegated to 
counties by the state under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-403. In contrast, this court stated in 
Green v. Turner, 2000 UT 54, f5, 4 P.3d 789, that whether a county acted within its 
statutory authority was a matter of statutory interpretation. See also, Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992)(stating that whether a county "overstepped 
the bounds of its legislatively delegated authority" was a "pure question[] of law" that 
depends on statutory interpretation). The issue of whether the county validly enacted a 
regulation is one of statutory interpretation that the court considers de novo. Anderson v. 
Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, 108 P.3d 701. 
It is difficult to see how restrictions on the sale of land are necessary for the 
temporary construction restraints. Clearly, the county could have restricted the "erection, 
construction, reconstruction, or alteration" of the buildings in the area without placing 
restrictions and conditions on the sale of land. Although the county may have attempted 
to promote health, safety, and welfare, it lacked the power to do so by restricting the sale 
of land because the requirements were neither expressly enumerated nor necessarily 
implied by Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-404 or any other provision of Title 17. 
V. Ordinance 97-13 Illegally Imposed a "Financial Requirement" in Violation of § 
17,27-404. 
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The county argues that Ordinance 97-13 did not impose any "financial 
requirement" on the landowners. In essence it argues that the landowners should have 
simply sat by and waited for the county to end the moratorium, which by its own terms 
would be in effect for an indefinite period of time. The "choice" the county speaks of is 
in reality a Hobson's Choice in that it appears to present a free choice when in reality no 
alternative exists. Even when some lot owners attempted to show their lots were safe, the 
county refused to consider individual lot studies. The county made it clear that a detailed 
study of the whole area was required, the landowners would have to pay for it, and if a 
study was not performed, the moratorium would continue indefinitely. (R. 676 at 1258.) 
Whether the county requires funds be paid directly to the county for the study or 
requires payment to other professionals, this exaction or fee should be treated the same. 
In Nollan v. California Costal Com., 483 U.S. 825 (1987), one of the keystone cases 
regarding exactions in a takings context, Justice Scalia wrote that substance not form 
guides a court's determination, and that requiring parties to allow an access to the beach 
through their property as a condition of a building permit was the same as if California 
had come in and condemned an easement directly. Id. at 831. Likewise, in this case 
substance should prevail over form. The county clearly indicated the moratorium would 
continue until the study was completed, and the landowners had to pay for it. 
VI. Ordinances 97-h 97-6, and 97-13 Constitute a Compensable Taking. 
The county begins its argument on takings jurisprudence by asserting the 
landowners are barred from seeking relief under the Utah Constitution. Again, this 
argument is addressed in the landowners' memorandum attached in the addendum to this 
reply brief. (Add. to Reply Br. at 1-47.) 
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The county would have this court interpret state and federal takings law to hold 
that if a regulation denies all use of land, but the regulation may be removed in the future 
(regardless of how long that may be), there is value remaining in the land through 
speculation as to future values; and as such, there is no denial of all economic value, and 
the Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Com., 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), analysis cannot be 
applied. This argument misstates the nature of the case and misconstrues the ruling under 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
First, the landowners have always argued and claimed that the ordinances at issue 
are illegal, arbitrary and capricious, and as such they must be declared void ab initio. If 
there is such a finding, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County 
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), would control. As the court is well aware, in First 
English the Supreme Court set forth the remedy for a land use regulation that denies use 
of land and that has been invalidated by the courts. In addressing the invalidation of 
another temporary moratorium, the Court held that mere invalidation of the regulation 
was a constitutionally insufficient remedy: "We merely hold that where the government's 
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the 
government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during 
which the taking was effective." Id. at 321. In this case, the ordinances in question 
violated statutory and constitutional requirements, and more is required than to simply 
hold them invalid after the landowners lost use of their property for years. Just 
compensation for that lost time is what the constitution requires. Id. at 305. 
Even if the county ordinances are not invalidated by the court, a detailed analysis 
must be conducted under Tahoe and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S. 
10 
104, (1978). A discussion of the Tahoe case is presented in the appellants' brief, with a 
discussion of the factors to be considered, including legislative limitations on the length 
of a moratorium. (Br. of Appellants at 26-29.) Clearly there is no federal per se rule that 
a moratorium is a taking, nor is this what the landowners have argued. All that is sought 
is that this court recognize the precedence of Tahoe, and affirm that in Utah moratoria can 
go too far, and those that do, particularly those that ignore state law and go more than 
three times longer than allowed under statute, must be required to pay just compensation. 
The county would have this court rule that the Perm Central analysis of the 
landowners5 case, as directed by Tahoe, is now prohibited. But such a position goes 
directly against the precedent set by the Utah courts. Since the district court's ruling in 
this case, the Utah Court of Appeals held twice that the issue of regulatory takings is to be 
considered after a detailed factual inquiry, and that is not possible on summary judgment. 
In Arnell v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Adjustment 2005 UT App 165, 112 P.3d 
1214, the court held that a Penn Central analysis requires a factual determination of the 
effect the regulation has on the beneficial uses of the property. Even if a regulation falls 
short of eliminating all economically beneficial use of land, an analysis of a complex set 
of Penn Central factors indicates whether the interference is so great that a taking has 
nonetheless occurred. "These inquires are informed by the purpose of the Takings 
Clause, which is to prevent the government from 'forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.fl,Id. at Tfl7(quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533 U.S. 606, 617(2001). 
It is important to note that contrary to the county's arguments that the moratorium 
was necessary, a fact that is disputed, the court of appeals held that even "a state statute 
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that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-
backed expectations as to amount to a taking.'Arnell at ^34 (quoting Penn Central 438 
U.S. at 127). It added that "[determinations of liability in regulatory takings cases, 
particularly under Penn Central require 'complex factual assessments of the purposes and 
economic effects of government actions/ making summary judgment generally 
inappropriate." Arnell at p 6 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523, 
(1992)). Likewise in Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele County, 2004 UT App 135, 91 
P.3d 841, the court of appeals held that a Penn Central factual inquiry is necessary into 
not only the character of the government action, but also into the economic impact of the 
regulation. 
While the county argues that the character of its action was substantially related to 
the public health, safety, and general welfare as a matter of law, it fails to address the 
economic impact of the regulations and their interference with the landowners5 distinct 
investment-backed expectations. (Br. of Appellees at 32.) Similarly, the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the county because when the inquiry asks 
if a "regulation has gone 'too far'... no answer is possible until [the] court knows what 
use, if any, may be made of the affected property." Diamond. 2004 UT App 135 at ^ [18 
(quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo. 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986)). 
Like in Diamond and Arnell the district court granted summary judgment without a 
factual inquiry into the economic impact of the county's regulation and the properties' 
beneficial use during the extended moratorium. 
As to the county's argument that it is too late to ask for a Penn Central analysis, 
both the High Court and the Utah courts have addressed the issue. In Arnell the court 
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noted that up to that point in the litigation the plaintiff only presented a theory of a total 
taking, and as such its review was based on that theory, but remanded the case to be 
analyzed under a Penn Central analysis. Arnell, 2005 Ut App 165 at p 6 . The basis for 
this remand is further explained in footnote 15 where the court points out that: "Although 
Plaintiff has thus far proceeded only under a total takings theory, as the district court 
undertook a partial takings analysis during summary judgment, on remand Plaintiff will 
be able to pursue his claim under either a total or partial takings theory." Id. at n. 15. 
Also in Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-31, the court remanded for consideration of the 
claimant's takings claim under the Penn Central analysis even though the claimant 
proceeded only under a total takings theory in the court below. Id., at 650. 
In the case at hand, just as in Arnell the district court based its decision in part on 
Penn Central (Br. of Appellees at 30-31), but it did so without a detailed factual inquiry 
and without the appropriate fact-fmder in place. Therefore, if the county ordinances are 
not invalid, it would be appropriate, indeed necessary, for the matter to be remanded for a 
factual inquiry into the Penn Central factors. 
Finally, the county's only argument that the ground water monitoring wells do not 
result in a physical taking is that there has been no interference with the use of the land. 
(Br. of Appellees at 32-33.) The county misunderstands the standard for establishing a 
physical taking. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419, 436 
(1982), the Supreme Court clarified that it is not the extent of interference that defines a 
physical taking, but the nature of the invasion of private property: 
Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly 
invades and occupies the owner's property. . . Property law has long 
protected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at 
least in the possession of his property.. . Furthermore, such an occupation 
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is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a 
regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner 
may have no control over the tuning, extent, or nature of the invasion. 
The Supreme Court went on at page 437 to clarify that the issues raised by the 
county are not factors that determine the occurrence of a taking, but instead are factors in 
detennining what compensation is due: 
Finally, whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents 
relatively few problems of proof. The placement of a fixed structure on land 
or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute. Once 
the fact of occupation is shown, of course, a court should consider the extent 
of the occupation as one relevant factor in detennining the compensation due. 
VII. Ordinances 97-L 97-6 and 97-13 Violate Landowners' Due Process and Equal 
Protection Rights. 
In arguing the equal protection and due process claims, the county ignores the 
existence of the "class-of-one" theory in which the plaintiffs allege they have been 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and that there is no rational 
basis for the difference in treatment. Recognized by the High Court in Village of 
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000), the class of one acknowledges 
government motives can and do target individual citizens. In such cases the question of 
government intent is directly at issue when there has been a showing of ill will. "To 
succeed on such an equal protection claim, the [plaintiffs] must prove that they were 
'singled out for persecution due to some animosity/ meaning that the actions of [the city] 
were a 'spiteful effort to fgef [them] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state 
activity/" Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Schools. 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001). 
Furthermore, the use of the rational basis standard supplied by the county (Br. of 
Appellees at 33-34) does not apply to the instant case. The cases cited by the county deal 
with statutes of general application, not a class-of-one like Olech, in which there must be 
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an inquiry into the motives behind government actions. Instead the standard is whether 
these actions were "objectively unreasonable." In Mimics, Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 394 
F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005), the plaintiffs argued that they were harassed by the local 
building inspector due to personal conflicts and small town politics. The court recognized 
the precedence of Olech and applied an "objectively unreasonable" standard to determine 
if the plaintiffs' claim was sufficient to survive summary judgment. Id. at 849. 
Having determined that there is evidence that the entries by [the 
building inspector] were objectively unreasonable, we view [the 
building inspector's] reporting of [plaintiffs'] potential code violations 
to government officials as part of his overall conduct. At this stage of 
the litigation, the [plaintiffs] have thus presented sufficient evidence 
that the whole of [the building inspector's] conduct was motivated by 
political spite and that the [plaintiffs] were treated differently than 
others similarly situated 
Therefore, the question is not whether there is a rational basis for imposing the 
moratoria on the landowners, but did the county act out of spite in applying regulations 
only to landowners and not to others similarly situated. The landowners have presented 
sufficient evidence of ill will to survive summary judgment.4 (Br. of Appellants at 52-
53.) 
VIII. Resolution 99-11 Violates the First Amendment. 
The county argues that Resolution 99-11 simply codifies the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and only regulates communications of the county's control group. (Br. of 
Appellees at 34-35.) This argument is wrong for two reasons. First, Rule 4.2 only 
regulates the communications of attorneys with represented parties and has no application 
4In Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, |33, 67 P.3d 466, 476, this court 
recognized the class-of-one claim under Olech and held there must be allegations of 
misconduct unrelated to the official office, as has been alleged in this case. 
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to party-to-party communications as are restricted in Resolution 99-11. Second, the 
county completely ignores the second paragraph of the resolution that clearly controls the 
conduct of ah county employees (R. 676 at 603)(emphasis added): 
When plaintiffs attempt to communicate with an elected official or the 
above-described county department heads or county employees regarding 
matters related to pending litigation, the elected official, county department 
head or county employees shall immediately terminate the communication 
and refer the plaintiff to the County Attorney's Office. 
Furthermore, the county's argument about the "public concern" test is completely 
misplaced as the public concern test only deals with the question of when a public 
employee can sue for being disciplined for speaking out against a government employer. 
Finally, the county argues the there has been no showing that the landowners have 
been affected by Resolution 99-11. (Br. of Appellees at 35.) This impact was clearly laid 
out at the district court level as it was shown that an application or form submitted to the 
county by any other resident of the county was obtained by simply asking for it while at 
the same time being denied to a Canyon Meadows landowner until the request was 
reviewed and granted by the county attorney. (R. 676 at 1619-1618, 962-961, 901-899.) 
IX. The District court Should Have Considered the Parties' Stipulation Before Ruling 
Res Judicata Excluded the Issues Regarding County Health Board Policies. 
It has been established in Utah case law that if a stipulation is reached by mistake, 
misrepresentation, or fraud, it is generally voidable and the district court has jurisdiction 
to grant a party relief from the effects of a stipulation so entered. In Tanner v. Dist. 
Judges of the Third Dist. CU 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982), plaintiffs dismissed their claims 
against the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency in reliance on representations made by 
the RDA, but later claimed the RDA changed or misstated its position and asked the 
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stipulation be set aside.5 The Utah Supreme Court ruled that where an issue is still on 
appeal, it is within the jurisdiction of the district court to look into whether a stipulation 
had been obtained by mistake or misrepresentation. Id. at 6. 
Here the landowners never intended to waive a right to review the health board 
polices, but intended that they would be addressed in the main body of this takings case. 
There was no reason to anticipate the county would switch its position since the takings 
case was filed well before the other case, included basically the same parties, and because 
both sides agreed these issues would be addressed in this case. Based on Tanner, the 
district court should have looked at the conditions surrounding the stipulated dismissal. 
X. The District court Erred in Compelling Discovery and Awarding Attorneys' Fees. 
The discovery question at issue is as follows (emphasis added) (R. 676 at 2573): 
Please specifically identify the clearly established law you claim 
Defendant Mathis violated in each of the events you identified in Response 
to Interrogatory (l)(a). 
The advisory notes to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cite to the 
case of U.S. v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n. 22 F.D.R. 300 (D.C.D. 
C.1958), to illustrate what it meant when using the term "pure law": "to answer it would 
be in effect to submit a skeletonized brief on the facts and the law. It is not the purpose of 
discovery to ascertain what arguments the opposing party intends to use to support his 
contention." Fed. R. Civil Pro. 33(b) advisory committees note. The landowners, and 
apparently the county, have been unable to locate case law from Utah directly on point 
regarding this issue, but numerous jurisdictions have addressed the point and ruled 
5See Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 
1987) for a more detailed analysis of the facts. 
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against compelling lay witnesses to propound pure legal recitation. See, Able v. Eaton. 
1979 Ohio App. Lexis 9141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979)(questions asking what statutes or rules 
of law required the parties to take certain actions and upon what legal authority the 
plaintiffs relied in answering the interrogatories are inappropriate.) See also, O'Brien v. 
Inf 1 Brotherhood of Electric Workers, 443 F. Supp 1182, 1187, (N.D.G.A. 1977) 
(question of why provisions of union contract should not be given full force and effect 
disallowed as pure legal analysis.) 
The rules of discovery allow inquiries as to opinions on the application of facts, 
but they do not open the door to force those with no legal training to interpret the 
meaning of the law, let alone identify specific case names and statutes. While the county 
argues there was no prejudice in the district court's order compelling discovery, it ignores 
the fact that the order also imposed an award for $3500 in attorney's fees that was 
inappropriate and should be reversed. 
XI. The District Court Erred in Striking John Doe Plaintiffs. 
It is completely disingenuous for the county to argue the court should ignore the 
discovery that was conducted during the federal phase of this case. As argued at the 
district court (Add. to Reply Br. at 48-51) this matter was first filed in 1997, the county 
then removed the matter to federal court. (R. 676 at 100-101.) While this matter was 
before the federal court most of the discovery was conducted including depositions, 
interrogatories, and requests for production. The county then moved for the matter to be 
dismissed from federal court and again refiled in the state court, and the parties agreed it 
would not be necessary to redo all of the work already done. This agreement is evidenced 
by the fact that the discovery requests that were the subject of the very motion to compel 
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are labeled the "Defendants Third Set of Written Discovery." (R. 676 at 2446.) The first 
and second set of discovery requests are not in the record because they took place in the 
federal case. Even more pointed is the deposition of Defendant Phil Wright. The 
deposition taken in the state court is labeled the "continued deposition" of Phil Wright (R. 
554 at 623) and counsel for the county made it very clear that the landowners "would not 
be permitted to reexamine on areas covered in the prior deposition." (R. 554 at 622.) The 
prior deposition was taken while the matter was in the federal court. (R. 676 at 1510.) It 
is also important to note that both parties relied on the discovery from the federal case in 
their motions for summary judgment in the state court.6 
It is unfair for the county to accuse the landowners of attempting to mislead this 
court when the parties by agreement have treated the discovery as one course of conduct 
since 1997. It would be wholly inequitable to arbitrarily exclude selected discovery 
responses that clearly demonstrate the county has known the identity of the John Doe 
landowners since 1998 and has conducted discovery directly related to them, including 
deposing those they wanted to. (R. 676 at 2757, 2753, 2750, 2747, 2745.) 
The county also argues that the landowners' constitutional rights do not attach to 
property. This ignores the clear holding in Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630, in which the court 
held that a takings claim "is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the 
effective date of the state-imposed restriction." Id. This principle was recognized in Utah 
6
 The record contains copies of excerpts of these depositions conducted under the 
federal case number at least 24 different times. (R. 554 at 53, 83, 269, 334, 362, 388, 512, 
673, 676, andR. 676 at 224, 278, 873, 919, 976, 1125, 1179, 1459, 1485, 1475, 1501, 
1505, 1510, 1515, 1875.) 
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in Arnell 2005 UT App 165 at ^9, when the court of appeals held a plaintiff could assert 
a takings claim even though he purchased after the challenged ordinance was adopted. 
The county complains they will be prejudiced due to increased exposure to 
damages and lack of ability to conduct discovery. (Br. of Appellees at 42.) The standard 
for the court to consider is not "prejudice/' because any time a court rules against parties 
they are prejudiced. The standard is that the party will be "unfairly prejudiced." 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Workers Inc. 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah Ct. App 1990). Here 
the county has known the identity of the landowners since 1998 and they have taken the 
depositions of those they wanted; therefore, such unfair prejudice or advantage will not 
occur. It must also be noted in relation to discovery, the parties expressly agreed to wrait 
to conduct discovery on damages until the liability issues were resolved. (R. 676 at 2493-
2492.) Therefore any claim of prejudice related to conducting discovery is disingenuous. 
XII. Landowners Have Not Waived Anv Claims for Purposes of Appellate Review. 
The county argues that the landowners waived their claims for zoning estoppel by 
acquiescing to summary judgment in the best interest of the courts and all of the parties. 
In support of its argument, the county pieces together a quote from the Utah Supreme 
Court in Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987). The county presents only a slice of 
the court's actual ruling in an effort to expand the scope of the court's holding. The 
general rule given by the Utah Supreme Court is that "one who accepts a benefit under a 
judgment cannot later attack it." Id. at 613. In Trees, the trial court ordered the defendant 
to sell his real property as a specific performance remedy. The defendant-seller moved 
off the property and accepted payment from the buyer. The county intentionally omits 
the active language from the court's holding in Trees in order to imply a purely passive 
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acquiescence of a judgment. However, in light of the facts in Trees, it is clear that the 
court intended greater action on the part of the party allegedly waiving its rights than a 
mere statement that summary judgment might be appropriate given earlier court rulings 
that eliminated all but a few causes of action and limited the facts upon which the 
plaintiffs could proceed. Such a statement does not demonstrate a benefit akin to the 
acceptance of payment from a judgment. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs made it very clear there was no concession on the merits 
of the issues as a whole, but that due to the limited ability to present the case in its 
entirety it may have been appropriate to grant the county's motion and allow the parties to 
address the issues on appeal. Indeed the discussion between the court and the parties 
demonstrated everyone understood this intent. (Add. of Appellees Br. at 31.) 
Mr. Duval: . . . So I believe that we need to have the record of the court of 
the best evidence we can present of, of what defenses, what our arguments 
in response to the motion for summary judgment. We don't want, those 
pleadings ignored, we want the court to take those into account. I'm just 
saying that it's my professional opinion at this point that we're not going to 
be able to cross the high hurdles because the facts that we need to present to 
the court have been precluded by previous rulings of the Fourth District 
Court. 
During oral arguments the court asked to clarify the landowners' position with the 
following question (Add. of Appellees Br. at 28): 
Judge: . . .and you'd like to make a record simply so that you have that 
record when you go up on appeal. 
Mr. Duval: That's correct, Your honor. 
The final exchange between the parties and the district court summarized the matter. 
(Add. of Appellees' Br. at 33-34.) 
Mr. Duval: The evidence isn't there now because its all been precluded 
by previous motions. With what we have at this point I don't believe we 
21 
can support the high threshold. These are not just by the preponderance of 
the evidence Your Honor. As you know the three remaining issues have 
very high thresholds that would require shocking to the conscience and, and 
we believe those things, the evidence has now been precluded so that I 
cannot effectively defend against those motions. 
Mr. Wentz: Your Honor, I hear him saying he'll, he'll agree on the record 
that our motion should be granted, and we'll reserve all further arguments 
about quite simply, Your Honor, there's never been any previous evidence 
withheld or excluded in this case. 
Judge: Well I hear him saying that he, that he doesn't believe that, that he 
believes that ultimately the motion for summary judgment must be granted. 
Mr. Wentz: I think that's fair. 
Judge: And based upon that I'm going to grant the defendant's motion for a 
summary, summary judgment in this case which I believe results in a 
dismissal of all the claims in this case, some previously having been 
dismissed and now these are dismissed. 
The landowners did not concede the issues, but expressly stated an intent to arrive 
at a situation in which all the issues could be presented and argued together. If there was 
an error, it was one both the parties and the district court agreed to. 
XIII. The District Court Erred in Granting the County Attorneys' Fees Under $ 1988. 
First, the question of the standard of review regarding the award of attorneys' fees 
to a prevailmg defendant must be revisited. In their opening brief the landowners stated 
that the standard of review should be abuse of discretion, which is the general rule 
regarding an award of attorneys' fees. However, upon further research in responding to 
the county's brief, it has become evident that the award of fees in this matter was based 
upon a finding of a statutory prerequisite, namely that the landowners' claims were 
frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless, or that the plaintiffs continued to litigate after it 
clearly became so. As such, the standard of review should be a review for correctness. 
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In World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp.. Inc.. 879 P.2d 253 
(Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court established that similar to § 1988 of the federal 
code, the Utah Civil Rights Act required a finding that claims were frivolous or 
groundless before fees could be awarded to a prevailing defendant. The court went on to 
rule that this was not an issue of discretion, but was a question of law: "Determining 
whether a civil rights plaintiffs claim is frivolous for subsection 13-7-4(d) purposes is a 
question of law." Id. at 262. Therefore, the question of whether the landowners' claims 
were frivolous and, if so whether, they continued to litigate after this became evident is a 
legal question to be reviewed de novo and not an abuse of discretion standard. 
Critical to this review is the fact that the district court made a blanket legal 
conclusion that the landowners knew or should have known they could not prevail 
without reference to any supporting findings of fact. (R. 676 at 3990-3989.) The district 
court notes a set of discovery requests sent in July 2002, but ignores the facts that both 
parties continued to pursue settlement options, continued to conduct additional discovery, 
and continued researching and refining their cases. The final discovery was not complete 
until the middle of 2005. (R. 676 at 2942.) Indeed it was not until June of 2005 that the 
county filed its second motion for summary judgment. It was only upon review of this 
second motion for summary judgment that the landowners were able to come to the 
conclusion that they made. Further, the landowners specifically requested a hearing on 
the issue of attorneys' fees, but the district court denied the request and summarily made 
its conclusions of law without the necessary factual findings. (R. 676 at 3990-3989.)7 
7Due to the rotations of judges in the Fourth District, Judge Schofield did not have 
exposure to the extended history of this case as he was newly assigned to this matter. 
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Also, the court must be mindful of the warnings of the Supreme Court in 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC 434 U.S. 412, 421-422 (1978) where it said: 
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the 
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding 
that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been 
unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could 
discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective 
plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that 
he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's 
claims may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. 
Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change 
or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear 
questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely 
reasonable ground for bringing suit. 
In this case, without the benefit of any factual inquiry, the landowners have been 
subjected to fees for doing exactly what Christiansburg requires. In doing a careful 
analysis of arguments presented by the county in its second motion for summary 
judgment, it started to become apparent that this case was suffering death by a thousand 
cuts. Even if they could prevail on the second motion for summary judgment, which the 
landowners believed was possible as shown by the arguments in their memorandum in 
opposition to the second motion for summary judgment, the landowners had to consider 
what would be left to present to a jury. As pointed out at oral arguments, it became 
evident that due to the numerous rulings that had gone against them up to that point in the 
litigation, it was not prudent to continue without the ability to present the whole picture at 
once. Therefore, just as is required by Christiansburg. the landowners did not continue to 
litigate after it became evident they might not prevail on the remaining issues. Therefore 
the district court's ruling was reached without sufficient findings of facts and 
inappropriately applied the wrong standard to the statutory requirements. 
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Finally, it must be noted that the case law cited by the county also makes it clear 
that if the landowners prevail on one significant issue in the matter, the county ceases to 
be the prevailing party under § 1988 and is not entitled to any attorney's fees. Prochaska 
v. Marcoux. 632 P.2d 848, 854 (10th Cir. 1980). Therefore, if the court reverses the 
district court on a significant issue, the attorney's fees herein must likewise be remanded 
for a final detennination of a prevailing party in the matter. Also, as regarding attorney's 
fees on appeal, Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that a f,party 
seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and 
set forth the legal basis for such an award." (Emphasis added.) The county has not met 
the requirements of this rule as it did not explicitly request fees on appeal. In Advanced 
Restoration v. Priskos; 2005 UT App 505, 126 P.3d 786, the court refused to award 
attorney's fees on appeal because the party did not properly brief its request. Id. [^37. As 
the county did not articulate the basis for its request for fees or even address the proper 
statute, the county should not be awarded any attorney's fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The landowners' request the relief set forth at pages 67-69 of their opening brief. 
DATED this J3 day of February 2007. 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C. 
Gordon W. Duval v 
Brian K. Haws 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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) OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
) Case No. 20051110 - SC 
Appellees ("County") have requested that summary disposition be entered in this 
matter based on the allegation that Appellants ("Landowners") have failed to allege or 
seek state inverse condemnation relief, and that therefore, their claims are not ripe. 
However, the County's motion should be denied because the Landowners properly pled 
and argued their state inverse condemnation claims before the trial court. 
Rule 8(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "no technical form of 
pleadmgs or motions are required" and subsection (f) of the rule states that "[a]U 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." Indeed pleadings need only 
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put the opposing part}1 on notice. See Rosen] of A. Sullivan. 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 
19S3)(under Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a), a pleader is required only to make a short and plain 
statement of his claim); Blackham v. Snel grove. 280 P.2d 453. 454 (1955)(a complamt is 
required only to give the opposing party fail* notice of the nature and basis or grounds of 
the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved): Cheney v. Rucker. 
381 P.2d 86. 91 (1963) (parties are entitled to notice of the issues raised and an 
opportunity to meet them);Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co.. Utah, 656 P.2d 966, 
970-71 (1982.) Furthermore, when looking at whether a pleading is sufficient Rule 8(a) 
is to be construed liberally. Id. (Also see Cheney. 381 P.2d at 211.) 
In this case the factual basis alleged throughout the complaint provides a 
sufficient basis upon which to allege a violation of the Utah Constitution. Specifically 
Tf 120 of the complaint alleges that the ordinances constitute "inverse condemnation". This 
allegation is more than sufficient to put the defendant on notice that plaintiffs' claims 
encompass a claim to the rights and protections afforded by the Utah Constitution and 
Article I, Section 22. 
In this case, as shown by the attached excerpts from the Landowners' Amended 
Complaint (Exhibit 1). the Landowners' third cause of action is entitled "The Moratorium 
Ordinance Constitutes an Inverse Condemnation." The complaint states that the numerous 
Wasatch County Ordinances and moratoria passed against the Landowner's properties: 
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. . . constitute an unlawful talcing (inverse condemnation) that had damaged 
plaintiffs in an amount equal to the purchase price of their lots, the improvements 
thereon, and the costs of fees related to the geological studies required by Wasatch 
County. 
(Exhibit 15 Rat 362-363,) 
The Landowners' complaint also states in the third cause of action that Wasatch County 
had not paid or offered to pay any compensation for the losses plaintiffs suffered as a 
result of the County ordinances and moratoria. (Exhibit 1. R.,at 362-363.) These 
allegations of the County's unlawful talcing and inverse condemnation are sufficient 
under Rule 8 to give the County fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of a claim 
and an indication of the type of litigation as required by Utah law. 
In addressing whether the defendants had adequate notice, the procedural history 
of this case is important to understand. The first complaint filed in this litigation was 
filed in state court in Wasatch County, thereafter the defendants then promptly removed 
the matter to federal court. (R. at 101-100.) Then in the federal court, the defendants 
made the exact same argument they are making now and moved for dismissal from the 
federal court for lack of ripeness. The matter was re-filed in Wasatch County and then 
venue was changed to Utah County and the present case number was assigned. Clearly 
the defendants cannot now argue prejudice as it was clear the matter was being brought 
back to state court to specifically address the state claims to satisfy the ripeness issues 
now raised. 
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Furthermore, the record makes it perfectly clear that the Utah Constitution was 
addressed, briefed and argued by both sides at the trial court level. The Landowners 
argued hi their Memorandum in Opposition to Wasaich County's Amended Motion for 
Summary Judgment that the County's actions, ordinances, and moratoria constituted a 
regulatory taking and a physical taking both under the law of Utah and the United States. 
(See Excerpts of Memorandum attached hereafter as Exhibit 2, R.. at 1608-1617, 1638.) 
Specifically, the Landowners argued on page 10 of that memorandum (R.; at 1608,) that 
"Takings must also be analyzed separately under Utah law because the takings clause in 
the Utah Constitution is different than the takings clause under the federal constitution." 
The Landowners cited to Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, Coleman v. Utah 
State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (1990). and set forth fact and arguments for a page and a 
half that a taking had occurred under Utah law. The defendants also presented arguments 
as to why Utah law did not apply or provide relief to the plaintiffs (see R. at 412-411, 
1896-1985, 1892, attached as Exhibit 3) and most importantly, the trial court relied on 
Utah law in reaching its decision. (R. at 2137-36, 2134-2133, attached as Exhibit 4.) 
Clearly, the state claims were briefed, argued and the trial court looked at state law 
in reaching its decision. Thus, even if the plaintiffs were technicall}7 deficient for failing 
to include the four words "under the Utah Constitution." a point that is not conceded 
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herein, the appropriate remedy would noi have been a dismissal, but an amendment to the 
pleadings under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a) states: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of an)7 party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission 
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
upon the merits.... 
Ii is true that no motion to amend was made at the trial court, but this Court has 
made it clear that this is not fatal to the plaintiffs' appeal. In Armed Forces Ins. 
Exchange v. Harrison. 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 42. the plaintiff had failed to adequately 
plead its fraud claims against the defendant, but the defendant nevertheless responded and 
the trial proceeded based upon those claims. At the end of the trial there was no motion 
to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence, but the court, citing Seamons v. 
Anderson. 122 Utah 497, 502, 252 P.2d 209, 212 (1952). found that failure to amend to 
confonn to the evidence is non-prejudicial and went on to state "because the issue was 
tried, it must be treated as if it were properly raised in the pleadings. (Emphasis added) 
Armed Forces at % 24. (.Also see Gill v. Timm 720 P.1352.1353 (Utah 1986.) 
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Clearly, the Landowners' Amended Complaint provided an adequate notice of 
their state and federal takings and inverse condemnation claims as required b}7 Utah law. 
Further, it is equally clear that the Landowners fully raised, argued and availed 
themselves of state law takings or hiverse condemnation remedies before the lower court, 
as required b)7 Utah and federal law, by providing separate arguments, analysis, and legal 
citation for both state and federal takings claims. The defendants were not prejudiced as 
they addressed the issues themselves and as the court cited to state talcing law in support 
of its ruling. Therefore, the County's motion should be denied. 
DATED this IZ day of Januaiy 2007. 
C_^GGRDON DUVAL ^ _ ^ 
BRIAN K. HAWS 
GREGORY G. HANSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants Landowners 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERMCE 
I certify that on January _L>L, 2007,1 caused a true and correct cop}' of the 
foregomg OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, to be sen'ed 
by mailing it by first class mail to: 
Craig V. Wentz 
Barton H. Kunz 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. ?.C. 
50 South Main £1500 
- Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Paralegal 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Gordon W Duval, Ear No 6532 
Brian K Haws, Bar No 819S 
"Trey" A R Daves EI, Bar No 7504 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLE\, P C 
] 10 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Telephone (801)785-5350 
Facsimile (801) 785-0S53 
Attorneys for Canyon Meadows Homeowners Association 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
100 West 125 Noah, Provo, Utah S4603 
John and Olga Gardner, Individually Robert and 
Michelle Perez, Individual]}, Howard and Helen 
\ arilee;, Individually, Victor and Linc£ Orvis, 
Individually, Hugh and Carolyn Allied, 
Individually. Helen Van Orman, Individually, 
Blake and Nancy Rone), Individually, Aldo and 
Valene Bussio, Individually, Dee and Wilmadean 
Olsen, Individually, Steve and Bridget Hirschfield 
Individual!}, and John Does 1-72, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Board of Count} Commissioners of Wasatch 
Count}', a Legislative Body. Wasatch Count} a 
Political Subdivision, Bob Mathis, Wnsaich 
Count} Planner and Individually, Phil Wright, 
V asatch County Health Director and Individual!}, 
'Ralph Duke, Wasatch Count} Commissioner and 
Individually, Michael Kohler, Wasatch Counrv 
Commissioner and Individually, Laren Provost, 
Wasatch Counrv Commissioner and Individual!}, 
Keith Jacoboson, Individually, Sharron Winienon, 
Individual I}, 
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 
JURY DEMAND 
Civil No 9904033554 
JudgeJames R Taylor 
Defendants 
111. Defendant Phil Wright has, under the color of statute or rule, imposed unauthorized 
requirements and regulations upon the plaintiffs, knowingly and intentionally violating plaintiffs' 
due process and equal protection nghts. In the alternative Phil Wright, the Wasatch County 
Health Director for nearly 20 years, was willfully ignorant or plainly incompetent as to the lawful 
and binding regulations in Wasatch County and simply substituted his own rules and regulations in 
plain disregard for the plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process nghts. 
112 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 19S3. defendant Phil Wright is liable to the plaintiffs for the 
damages caused 
113. Defendants Laren Provost, Ralph Duke, Michael KohJer, Keith Jacobsoa, and Sharron 
Wimenon, while exercising the executive functions of county commissioners, did, with bad faith 
and malice, use the color of their office to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights, privileges, and 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States Executive actions of 
r • A nnni;« mipQ and laws upon the plaintiffs were based on defendant commissioners m enforcing and applies rules ana laws upon
 v 
malice and personal animosity toward plaintiffs 
114 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. defendant commissioners are liable tc the plaintiffs for the 
damages caused. 
THrRD CAUSE OF A C T T O N L 
THE MORATORIUM O ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ CONDEMNATION 
115 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by this reference paragraphs 1 to 115 as if fully set forth 
herein. 
25 
] 16. Wasatch Count)' Ordinance 97-] and Wasatch Ordinance 97-13 deprive plaintiffs all 
economically viable use of their property, and therefore effected a "taking" under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth .Amendments that required the payment of just compensation. 
117. No legitimate threat to public safety or potential public nuisance e>usted to justify the 
imposition of Wasatch Count)' Ordinance 97-1 and Wasatch Ordinance 97-13 or the 
accompanying defacto moraiorium 
1 IS Further, § 17-27-404 prohibits the imposition of fees and financial obligations on the 
propert)' owners as a result of a temporary' ordinance However, the county required the Canyon 
Meadows Home Owners Association to expend over 550,000 in geotechnical studies before it 
would consider lifting the moratorium. 
119. The County has not paid or offeied to pay any compensation for the losses plaintiffs have 
suffered as a result of Wasatch County Ordinance 97-1 and Wasatch Ordinance 97-lT^and the 
accompanying defacto moratorium 
120 As such, the Ordinances constitute an unlawful taking (inverse condemnation) that has 
damaged the plaintiffs in an amount equal to the purchase price of their lots, the cost of all 
improvements thereon, and the costs and f^ts related to the geological studies required by 
Wasatch County Plaintiffs are also entitled to other damages to be proven at trial including lost 
appreciation of value. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Gordon W. Duval. Bai No. u532 
Brian K Haws, Bai No 8198 
Bret C Anderson, Bar No 8134 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT &. MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Mam Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801)785-0853 
Attornevs for the Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN .AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
100 West 125 North. Provo. Utah 84603 
JOIITI and Olga Gardner, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch 
Count}', et al 
Defendants ] 
) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
} TO WASATCH COUNTY'S 
j AMENDED MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 990403554 
Judge James R. Taylor 
Plaintiffs hereby submit this memorandum in opposition to Wasatch County's Amended 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
1638 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
The plaintiffs have clear]}'presented sufficient claims to establish an unconstitutional 
taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution. As will be discussed below the county has affected a regulator}' taking as 
well as a physical taking. 
A. Regulatory Takings 
Defendants5 reliance on Lucas is misplaced and fails to state the general holding of the 
case. Defendants seem to represent that Lucas stands for the position that there is no taking if 
there is a legitimate public purpose behind the ordinance. This misrepresents the true holding of 
the case. Indeed. Lucas clearly establishes the basis for the plaintiffs' takings claims and is 
nearly a perfect match for the case at hand. 
Lucas bought two lots with the intention of building and was in the process of having 
plans drawn up when the Beach Front Management Act was passed that stopped all construction 
and prohibited Lucas from pursuing his plans. There is nothing to indicate that he had filed for a 
building permit or had done anything other than commission the plans. Lucas immediately filed 
suit seeking compensation under the takings clause. He did not challenge the validity of the act 
or the state's police power, but simply asserted that the exercise of the police power took all 
economically beneficial use of his property and therefore he was entitled to compensation. 
"While Lucas prevailed at the trial court, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding that 
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Lucar conceded thai the act was properly and validly designed 10 preserve South Carolina's 
beaches and concluding that where a regulation is designed to prevent serious public harm, no 
compensation is owing. 
On review the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that such reasoning applies 10 
regulations thai limit or diminish the use and value of property, but it uuequivocaliy established 
that when a regulation denies all economical benefit compensation musr be provided. The 
court said at page 1015: 
We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulator}' action 
as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced 
in support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel the 
property owner to suffer a physical invasion of his property. In general fat least 
with regard to permanent invasions;, no matter how minute the intrusion and no 
matter how weight}' the public purpose behind it we have required compensation. 
. . The second situation in which we found categorical treatment 
appropriate is where the regulation denies all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land. 
The Court makes it clear that a simple recitation to the public benefit does not eliminat 
the need to provide compensation: "A fortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use 
justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory 
taldngs must be compensated." Id. at 1026. Throughout the opinion the Court makes it clear that 
regulations that cause a complete deprivation of economical benefit constitutes a taking. For 
example at page 1019 the court said: 
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief 
that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all 
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economical]} beneficial uses n< the name of common good thai is to leave his 
propem economically idle, he has suffered a taking 
Tins categorical rule is near])' without exception At pd^ic 1027 the Court did explain one 
instance m which the state might not be lequired to pa\ compensation under a regulation 
depriving a land owner of all economical benefit 
AAliere the state seeks to sustain a regulation that deprives land of all economical]}' 
beneficial use we think it may resist compensation onh if the logical!) antecedent 
inquiry1 into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests 
were not part of his title to begin with 
Fee simple title to land without previous limitations such as the plaintiffs' in the present case, 
includes the abilnj to use tne land m some reasonable economic fashion The Supreme Coun 
recognized tins basic premise when it rejected South Carolina's argument that Lucas's title was 
subject to implied limitations The Coun explained at page 102S 
In the case of land, however, we think that the notion pressed by the Council that 
title is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation5 that the state may 
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the 
historical compact recorded m the Takings Clause that has become part of our 
constitutional culture 
If there is an easement, a recorded agreement, or a genera] lav, ahead} affecting title to 
the property, then there ma} be a basis for avoidmg compensation as the property owner v> ould 
be on notice when he acquired title How ever, the Court goes on to explain 
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere m the title itself, in the restrictions that 
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place 
upon landownership A law or decree with such an effect must, m other words, do 
no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved m the courts - by 
-3-
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adjacent landowners (or other unique]}' affected persons) under the State's lav\ of 
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate 
nuisances thai effect the public generally, or otherwise. 
The defendants' arguments and quotation from Lucas, which are complete}}' oui of 
context come from the Court's recitation of takings history. Tins histon lesson the Court 
provided was specifically to rebut the same argument the defendants are now malang. Because 
me South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the position the defendants are now asserting, the 
United States Supreme Court found it necessary to explain that while one line of junspmdence 
had developed to acknowledge that there ma}7 be a basis to avoid compensation where the 
regulation does not effect a complete deprivation of economic ^alue. ihe well established and 
often cited rule is that the "Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation Ldoes not 
substantial!}' advance a legitimate state interest, or denies an owner economically viable use of 
his land"" (Emphasisin original at 1016, citing Aginis v. CitvofTibarom 447 LIS. 255. 260 
(19S0).) 
The plaintiffs acknowledge that it is important to the defendants' case to distinguish and 
overcome Lucas. However, the defendants do not attempt to distinguish it or present any 
argument why it should not apply. They have simply chosen to limit their discussion of Lucas to 
the few paragraphs of history that best suit them, even though this argument presents a 
completely inaccurate representation as to the holding of the case. 
Defendants then move on to the case of Kopetzke v. County of San Mateo. 396 F. Supp 





asking this coun to rum bach the hands of time and to ignore the last quaner century of taknms 
law. The United States Supreme Coun has significant]) and substantially addressed takings law 
since the one district court case cited by the defendants was issued m 1975. The plaintiffs cite 
below some of the recent landmark cases. 
First, m Penn Central Transn. Co. v. City of New York. 98 S.Ct 2646 (1978), the Coun 
recognized for the first time that a property owner's "investment-backed expectations" were a 
legitimate factor to consider in takings issues. This reasonable expectation, along with other 
factors such as the economic impact of a regulation and the character of the states' actions, were 
essential factual inquiries that had to be balanced to determine whether a taking had occurred. 
Shortly thereafter, the Court issued Loretto v. Telenromnter Manhattan CATV Corp.. 
102 S Ct. 3164 H9S2). which, as discussed more fully below, determined that any regulation 
mandating or authorizing a permanent physical invasion of property7, no matter how insignificant, 
constituted a taking as it clearly impaired a property7 right to exclude and control ones own 
property. The Court clarified that this holding applied despite the validity or importance of the 
public policy or police power to support the regulation. 
In 1987 the Supreme Court issued two seminal opinions which greatly altered the face of 
takings law. hi Nollan v. California Costal Commission, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987j; the Court 
established that there must exist an essential nexus between the legitimate state mterest sought to 
be furthered and the condition to be imposed. Without such a nexus a taking exists and 
compensation must be provided. 
-5-
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The second cast w as Fnsi English E\ angelica1 Lutheran Chuich of Gleuciale \ Counn of 
Los AJIgeles, 4S2 L S 3u4 (1%7) uhere the Court specificalh recognized that compensation 
musi be paid foi the period when the property v as \ alueless The Court did recognize thai 
lemporan takings did not resuli from the normal delays m obtaining a building permit but weie 
fact sensitive hi First English, the plaintiff landowner purchased land on which it operated a 
campground and recreational area The land w as located in a canvon along the banLs of a creel 
that v as the natural drainage channel for a watershed area Subsequently a flood destioyed the 
plaintiff landowner's buildings on the land In response to the flood, the defendant county 
adopted an interim zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction 01 reconstruction of an} 
building or structure m an interim flood protection aiea v>luch included the land on which the 
plaintiff landowners buildings stood 
In deciding the case, the United States Supreme Court stated that "temporary takings 
which den} a landowner all use of Ins property, are no different m land from permanent 
takings " First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale at 238S The court found 
there to be a temporary taking winch required just compensation It held that tk[w]here the 
government's activities have ahead} worked a talang of all use of property no subsequent action 
by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the penod during vhich 
the taking was effective " Id. at 2388 
The facts m the present case are very similai to those m Fret Enehsh The defendants in 
the present case, like the defendant in First English, appro\ ed and enforced interim zomne 
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ordinances which prohibited the plaintiff landowners from constructing on their canyon properly. 
In addition to the similarities, the defendants' actions in the present case are more egregious than 
those of the defendant m Firsi English since the defendants in the present cise actually approved 
and enforced their interim ordinances without the existence of any damage to am person's 
property, and without the threat of an)' imminent harm to any person or person's property. The 
ordinance was eventually overturned as invalid, but the Court specifically found that the 
plaintiffs in the case were entitled to compensation for the time it tool: to have the ordinance 
overturned. These temporary7 damages were found to be compensable. 
It should also be noted thai First Evangelical threw the Kopetzke ruling into serious 
doubt. It is highly doubtful the court in Kopetzke would have ever considered an interpretation 
of the takings clause that would have questioned a "police power" ordinance that stopped 
building in an area with a history of flooding, let alone paid damages for the time the ordinance 
was in effect. 
Following First Evangelical the Court issued Lucas in 1992. As discussed above, Lucas 
clearly and firmly established that if a regulation eliminated all economic value it constituted a 
taking unless the state could have prevailed on a nuisance claim. As pointed out in Lucas, it is 
highly "unlikely that common-lau principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable 
or productive improvements on the petitioner's land; the}' rarely support prohibition of essential 
uses of land." Lucas,505 U.S. at 1031, citing Curtin v. Benson. 222 US'. 78, 86 0911). The 
decision in Kopetzke was clearly and expressly based on the theory that the proper exercise of 
-7-
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pohce power does noi consiirute a tailing Kopeizke 396 F. Supp ai 1010. The basis for this 
holding was clear])' and express!)' overruled by Lucas. 
Following Lucas the Court issued its opinion m Dolan v CitvofTigard. 114 S. Ct 2309 
(1994). In Dolan the city required a property owner to dedicate a portion of her property in ordei 
10 gain a building permit. The Dolan Court established that the state has the burden of proof to 
establish that the benefit to the public of a required public dedication has a rough proportionality 
to the burden created by the proposed pnvate development. The scope of the broad police powei, 
which onl) had to be reasonable, was again refined in that the state now had the burden of not 
only showing the regulation was reasonable and that the burden imposed was related to the pubic 
good sought to be protected, but that the city now had to also show that the burden imposed on a 
property owner was reasonably related to the impact his development created. 
Finally hi 1999, the Supreme Court held that not only are property7 owners entitled to 
damages for temporary takings, but that the question of whether a governmental denial has either 
eliminated all economically viable use or fails to advance a legitimate public purpose can 
properly be decided by a jury. City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Duties, 119 S.C. 1624 (1999). 
The face of takings law has changed so significantly since 1975 that it should not be 
necessary to respond to Kopetzke . In Lucas the Supreme Court cites to four cases, all post 
1981, for its statement that regulations that deny all economical benefit are categorically 
compensable without case specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the 
regulation. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. The defendants are seeking to use outdated and 
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. • ., 11 -i*A c n , « qunreme Coun has rejected over the 
imaathonia,ive cases to advice a pcs.no, the United Slates Supr 
last quarter century. 
B. Physical Takings 
^ b v t h e c o u n ^ 
. i -iHmc in Loretto the defendant city enacted a law that prodded that a 
plaintiff landowner's building, hi Loretto, 
•t » rable television company to install its cable television facilities private landlord must permit a cable teleMSion
 v . 
A ^^^p-nT from the company in excess of the 
»pOT the landlord's property and may BO, demand payment from 
^ . t e t m t ^ . y . s t a t e — s i o . t o . e t e a s o p a . e . P o ^ t o . e s t a m t e . t . e 
. _ i s s m ™ W t h a , a o p , n m e S 1 p a y m e n , . a s a I e a s o n a M e f M . A t e p U r c h a s m g a f , , 
t e l e v l 5 1 0 n company had mstalled cables on the — , - — s " » - * * " » 
buildups ^ "noncrossovers" for serving appellant's tenants. 
T h e conn detenmned «h, the defendant city's law — • P ™ < ^ 
.„ , is a trfdn° «tho». retard to the pnblic b u r e t s that it may serve. Our 
authorized by government is a takm= v. 
,. , ..meases do not question it, and the purposes of the 
constitutional history confirms the rule, recent cases q 
M „ „ s C , a u s e compel ,ts retention, ^ , 4 1 , As a result, the defendant city , a s 
^u i red topay .us tcompensa t ionformeef fec ted ta^ofp^sproper tv . 
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The present case is similar to Loietio. hi the spring of 1991. and JUSI after the approval of 
Wasatch County Ordinance 97-01, the count} commissioners and defendants Mathis and Wright 
connnissioned and hired AGEC, a geotechmcal engineering company and agent of the county, to 
perform ground water table studies on the plaintiff landowners' real property in the Canyon 
Meadows subdivision. As a result, and without the input, authority or permission of the plaintiff 
landowners (and without an}' compensation to them J AGEC entered the plaintiffs' property. 
Under the direction of the defendants, AGEC employees drilled or dug 40 wells on the plaintiffs' 
property and installed monitoring devices (piezomeiers) on the property. As of the date of this 
memo, the wells and piezometers are still on the plaintiffs' property, thus, effecting a permanent 
tailing of the plaintiffs5 property. The plaintiffs have been denied the right to control their own 
property. The Supreme Court has clearly established that any permanent physical invasion of 
private properly7 constitutes a compensable taking nnder the Fifth .Amendment. 
Takings must also be analyzed separately under Utah law because the takings clause in 
the Utah Constitution is different than the takings clause under the federal constitution. The Utah 
constitution (at .Article 1, Section 22) is one of two states that goes beyond the standard 
"takings" clause by also prohibiting private property from being "damaged for public use without 
just compensation." to Coleman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained what it means in Utah to have property taken or "damaged." The 
supreme court first said at page 625 a "taking" under Article 1, Section 22 is "any substantial 
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building perrmu should be issued to them. Facu -, 32-33 Acvoidingi}. piairiiiftV inadequate 
notice claims with respect to Ordinance 97-13 should be dismissed 
C PLAINTIFFS* TAK1ING CLAIM SHOl'LD ]{£ DISMISSED 
Plaintiffs' third cause of action alleging inverse condemantion, fails for rwo reasons 
First, plaintiffs fail to meet the elements of a takings claim. Second, even assuming plaintiffs 
establish a prima facie tailings claim, it would not bt compensable because Wasatch County's 
conduct falls with the Lucas v. Southe Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S 1003 {1 L)L>2) doctrine. 
L Plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable tailings claim. 
Plaintiffs1 takings claims fail because they fail to establish a protectable property interest, 
overcome the County's assertion of a compelling interest, nor demonstrate their interest was 
taken for a public use. 
It is axiomatic under federal takings lavs thai an inverse condemnation claimant must 
possess some protectable interest m property before the claimant can reco\ er for an alleged 
deprivation of that interest :See Lucas at 1031. Because plaintiffs had not applied for building 
permits prior to the imposition of the moratona. the}' have not been deprived of a protectable 
interest. 
In Utah, the date of application for a building permit fixes the application of zoning laws. 
See Scherbel v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 758 P.2d 897. 900 (Utah 1988): Western Land, 617P.2d 
at 391; Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 288 (Utah Ct App. 1994j. With possibly tliree 
exceptions, none of the plaintiffs who owned the vacant lots in Canyon Meadows had applied for 
building permits prior to the January and July 1997 adoption of Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13. 
Facts, * 2o. Thus, onh three plaintiffs could bring a takings action. 
10 
Nevertheless, even supposing all plaintiffs had acquired a protectable propern interest 
under ihe vested rights doctrine, the Western Land decision nevertheless pcrmiis a go\ emmemaj 
entin 10 iLmore such rights when compelling public interests so dictate: 
At the same lime compelling public interest may. where appropriate., be 
given priority over individual economic interests. A city should not be 
undid) restricted in effectuating legitimate policy changes when the)' are 
grounded in recognized legislaih e police powers. There mavbe instances 
when an application would for the firs! time drav* attention to a serious 
problem that calls for an immediate amendment to a zonine ordinance, and 
such and amendment would be entitled to valid retroactive effect. 
Western Land, 617 p.2d at 396 (emphasis added). 
hi this case5 the compelling public interest was to stop development until the serious 
public health and safety issues of slope instability, subsidence and ground water contamination 
were studied and addressed. Facts, ^j 7-24. Moreover, the immediate action contemplated by 
the court in Western Land that would have "retroactive effect" is express])' authorized by Lhah 
Code Annotated § 17-27-404. 
In Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990), the 
Utah Supreme Court concluded that a property owner had no inverse condemnation claim under 
the federal Constitution if the alleged damages were not a direct, necessary, and unavoidable 
consequence of a public use. See id. at 1245. The ''public use" requirement is fmnly embedded 
in the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. Const. Amend. V ('l[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."). 
In the instant case, the purpose of the ordinances was to protect individuals and property 
owners from potential environmental hazards. There has never been a contention that the 
ordinances were designed to appropriate plaintiffs* proper!}' for the use of the public. To the 
contrary, the objective of the ordinances was to stop development until it was decided whether it 
11 
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Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' argument thai Ordinances 9"-1 and Lr-i3 effected temporary tailings under the 
Uiali Constitutiou also fails regardless whether the claim n recognized by the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint slates a cause of action lor tailing under onh the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United Stales Constitution. (.Am. Coinpl. ] 116 at 26). Plaintiffs 
cannot now amend their Amended Complaint to include a talangs claim under the Utah Constitution 
via a memorandum in support of a cross motion for summary judgment. See Car Carriers. Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 11 OK 1107 (711, Cir. 1984} C[l]i is axiomatic thai the Complaint may not 
be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss."). 
If plaintiffs were allowed to bring a tailings claim under the Utah Constitution, it would still 
fail for lack of a taking or damage 10 their properties. While the Utah Constitution's provision that 
"jpjrivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation," Utah 
Const, art. L C- 22 (emphasis added), is broader than the federal Constiunion's prohibition: c'nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," U.S. Const, amend. V, 
plaintiffs5 expansive interpretation of the phrase tkor damaged" goes too far. Plaintiffs interpret the 
phrase to mean the intangible damages their properties alleged!)' suffered as a result of the 
ordinances. (Pis/ Mem. in Supp. at 24-26). Utah case law makes clear, however, that the phrase 
means physical damage. In Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 
(Utah 1990).. the Utah Supreme Court held that "damages protectible under article I section 22 must 
be physical and permanent, continuous, or recllrrmg/',9 Id. at 1244 (emphasis added). 
Tims, even if plaintiffs had alleged a takings claim under the Utah Constitution, their 
propenies had lost value, and their harm was permanent, continuous, or recurring, their claim would 
' Defendants noie that plaintiffs miscliaracterize the Farmers decision as addressing temporary interference with 
vehicular access to buildings. (Pls.: Mem. in Supp. at 23). The claim in Farmers was instead based on water 
damage tp a building. Id, at 1243. 
19 
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hij] because lhe\ haM not shown thai th-n p u]cniri sufiieied pli^ica'damage worn the 
uunnan^es 
Moieoxei plumufis compLteh ignore the phiaSL Moi puL»lk I'Se^anpeaung in both 
constitutional provisions 45 the Utah Supienu Court stated m farm.-is 'Forpurposes uffjiiicle 1 
section 22] an imerst condemnation action rcijuncs (1) propert\ (2) a taking or damages and \3) a 
public use " ]d_ ai 12^3-44 Plaintiffs hd\ e pro\ided no evidence thai deiendanU ha\ e made or 
intend to male am public use of then properties 
B Argument that the oidmance^ depmed plaintiffs ofall economicalb beneficial use 
of then pioperties (Pis Mem n i Supp at24-2o) 
Plaintiffs assert that the\ have been deprived ofall economicalh beneficial use o "their properties 
because the oidmanccs temporauh prohibited them fiom buildmg residences (Pis Men, in Supp 
ai 25) As pre\ icush mentioned howe^ ei the simple fact that plamtiffs were xenporanl\ 
projubiied from building a lesidence did not depm c them ofall use of then properties See supia. 
Part A7 A 
Furthermore, onh oidmance 97-1 was a true moratorium Ordinance 97-13 allowed 
plaintiffs to build lesidence upon a satisfaction showing that the land was sufficient!) stable and the 
structui e sufficiently sound (See Defs ' Stmt of Facts, ^,32-33) Plaintiffs have pi ovided no 
specific evidence that the) were prolubited from building under 97-13 aftei such a showing hi fact, 
the e\idence demonstrates that building was allowed to proceed when the Count) 5s requirements 
weiemet (Defs Stmt of Facts, T]40) 
C Assertion that determinations regarding loss ofall use and advancing a public 
interest are foi a nm fPls ' Mem m Supp at 26) 
Defendants concede that the Supieme Court concluded that the issue of whethei a plaintiff 
has been deprived ofall use of propert) is '^predominantly factual,' and that whethei a land-use 
20 
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-F. Aruuniem thai plaintiffs have- proieeiahle interests. TPlsf Js-jem. iri Supp. at 29-30). 
Plaintiffs attempt 10 salvage their claim thai ihey enjoy protectable proper!)' interests by 
dtstmmnshintj Western Land Equities. Inc. v. CitvofLo^m. o]^ p.2d 388 (Utah 19S0)11, which 
holds thai the date of application for a building pennii fixts. the application of zoning laws, unless a 
compelling governmental interest'requires otherwise. SttuL at 391. Plaintiffs claim thai because 
the plaintiffs in Western Land were not deprived of all use of their property, that the case has no 
application to plaintiffs"1 claim. 
Whether the plaintiff has been deprived of all use of his or her land, however, is irrelevant to 
the genera] rule stated by the court in Western Land: "[A]n applicant for subdivision approval or a 
building permit is entitled to favorable action as the application confomis to the zoning ordinance in 
effect at the time of the application/' Id. (emphasis added). 
G. Assertion that plaintiffs are entitled to brine alternate claims of takings or 
negligence. (Pls.: Mem, in Supp. at 30). 
Plaintiffs have not pled a negligence claim as an alternative to their takings claim, and 
cannot now amend their Amended Complaint via their memorandum to include such a claim. See 
Car Gamers, 745 F.2d at 1107. 
Without any information whatsoever regarding Plaintiffs' unidentified negligence claim 
referenced in this paragraph, defendants cannot effectively oppose it. 
V. REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT THE COUNTY IS NOT IMMUNE. 
A. Argument that the County is not immune from equitable claims. (Pis.' Mem, in 
Supp. at 30-31). 
Defendants agree that insofar as plaintiffs pray for equitable relief on their state claims, the 
Count}' may not assert immunity. However, plaintiffs en in their assertion that all their State claims 




of Ulol. County, Staie ^ J u . ' 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN and OLGA GARDNER, ei al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BOARD of COUNTY COMMISSIONERS of 
WASATCH COUNTY, et al, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Date. June 21, 2001 
Case Number: 990401676 
Division V. Judge James R Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment which 
address or impact virtually every cause of action alleged in the Amended Complaint. The Court 
will consider each cause of acrtion in light of any party's request for ruling on that cause of action 
In consideration of a request for summary judgment: 
[i]f there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party. Thus, the court must evaluate 
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Wilkinson v Union 
Pac RR Co., 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998) quoting Bowenv Ri^erton Citv 656 
P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982) 
Moreover, : 
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show7 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving part}7 is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. URCP, Rule 56(c). 
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safers of „„••
 Qr Hripnendem study demonstrating xh building moratorium if the appi.can: car, provwe ar. independent
 3 
t h e proposed improvement It does no, appear tha, Ordmance ,7-6 was ever signed or p u s h e d 
Ordinance 97-6, although enacied well after the exprat.on of Ordmance 97-1, also appears to be 
a n attempt to extend the Hfe of tha: earher enactment of the Comm.ss.on The Court concludes 
that Ordinance 97-1, w.ch specially proved that h would «pire 6 months from the date of 
by a subsequent Ordinance. 
Ordinance 97-6 must, therefore, be considered as a separate enactment. In sp,te of an 
affirmative vote, there is no evidence before the Coon that Ordinance 97-6 was eve. si^ed or 
pub.ished. A, a matter of .aw, Ordmance 97-6 has, therefore, never bee, an effective c h a n c e 
(U.C.A § 17-53-208), A chalienge to an Ordinance which has never been effective is a moot 
issue and will not be considered further. 
Ordinance 97-13, the* must be considered as a new enactment of whatever regulations o, 
„ - „'rt,k analvsis is that this challenge tc Ordinance 97-13 provisions it defines The curious aspect o, this analj s.s 
. , „ • • j„;c;™ refl»-t»d bv the affirmative vote, but before the began within 30 days of the Comrrasston decision, retk-ctul o5 
Ordinance became effective by sig^ng and publication. The Court condudes that the ianguage 
within § 17-27-1001 s p e c i f y refers to the date of a decision, not the effective date of the 
ordmance and that this challenge is, therefore, timely filed and properly before the Court. 
These two ordmances were passed under the authority of U.C.A
 S§ 17-5-263' and 17-27-
404 Plamtrff alleges in paragraph 98 of the amended complaint that the ordinances were no. 
necessary under
 § 17-5-263 to pro.de for the general hotth. safety and wetfare of the public. 
i xhis § has now been renumbered as 17-53-223 
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Tht Supreme Court considered this section in 1980 and concluded that "fnjothing in § 17-5-77 
or in Title 17 suggests that the genera! welfare clause should be narrowly or strictly construed Its 
breadth of language demands the opposite conclusion,'* Staie \ Hutchinson, 624 P 2d 1116,1122 
CUT 1980).2 The undisputed evidence is that there has been a legitimate concern over the geology 
of the development area for a substantia! period of time In considering a similar challenge to the 
authority of a municipality to enact zoning regulation, the Supreme Court of Utah has stated* 
A municipality's land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference. . . . 
(citations omitted) . . . Therefore, "the courts generally will not so interfere with 
the actions of a city' council unless its action is outside of its authority7 or is so 
wholly discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious 
and arbitrary and thus in violation of the complainant's rights. Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. Cits7 of Springville, 1999 Utah 25, paragraph 23. 
There is nothing in the pleadings or the evidence before this Court by way of affidavit or 
other submission that would lead this Court to conclude that the County enactment of Ordinance 
97-13 was an arbitrary or capricious reaction to the long-standing geologic concerns. The 
Plaintiffs cause of action on this point fails as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff also claims a taking occurred3 under these ordinances without compensation and 
they are thus repugnant to the law and invalid (United States Constitution, Amendment V and 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I § 22, although no one in this case has briefed State 
Constitutional issues as distinct from claims under the United States Constitution). The court 
finds that no compensable taking has occurred The Court has already concluded that there was a 
compelling public interest in determining whether the slope was stable and whether septic tanks 
2
 This case construed § 17-5-77 which was re-numbered in 1994 and, again, in 2000 so 
that the current § 17-53-223 is the same language. 
3
 See paragraph 99 of the amended complaint. 
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study to be done Tms is not actual!) a fee and a? such is not contrary to Utah tew 
In summary to this point, the Coun concludes that only the Plaintiffs state lavv challenge 
to Ordinance 97-13 may be considered The challenge to Ordinance 97-1 was not time!) The 
challenge to Ordinance 97-6 is moot The Challenge to Ordinance 97-13 under this cause of 
action is found to be without merit, as a matter of law since the Ordinance appears to be a 
legitimate legislative response to a public welfare concern The regulation does not constitute a 
compensable talcing, the emergency Ordinance need not have been submitted to the Planning 
Commission for prior approval under the circumstances of this case and the additional expense 
required for approval under the Ordinance did not constitute a fee for statutory7 purposes. The 
Defendants should, therefore, receive summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action 
Second Cause of Action 
The Second Cause of action alleges 42 U S C §1983 violations by the County 
Commissioners and Defendants Mathis and Wright and includes claims that ordinances 97-1, 97-
13 and resolution 99-11 violate the constitutional principles of Due Process and Equal Proteaion 
The court finds that the actions of the county commissioners were legislative in nature. 
Under Bogan v. Harris, 523 US 44 (1998) the County Commissioners have absolute immunity for 
their actions related to these Ordinances, regardless of any alleged malice. 
Some of Defendants Wright and Mathis's alleged actions, if proven, are clearly non-
legislative in nature and a cause of action might be sustained with proof of bad faith and/or malice 
Such a determination would plainly require the receipt and weighing of evidence. Accordingly, 
the Court cannot summarily rule on the §1983 cause of action against these Defendants. 
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Third Cause of Action 
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oradditior 
„ •, The case law makes it quite clear that an mverse 
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of action. 
Fourth Cause of Action 
In the fourth caus, of aeon the Plaintiffs clatm that the Count,, already had appropriate 
zoning protections for the subject propeny ,n place before the Ord.nances questioned in this 
action were enacted, rendenng .he Ordinances unnecessary The P.am.iffs also allege that the 
County is estopped front denying, building p e n * undet the Ordinance because Defendants 
Mathis and Wright represented, shott.y before .he Ordmances were adopted, that if some of the 
P.ainuffs purchase, property withm .he development .ha, they could expect no problems FmaUy, 
the Plaintiffs wish a d e c l a r e judgment from this Court that the moratona impose, by the 
Ordinances are no longer in effect. 
Fn-st, the court finds that as a matter of law the zoning estoppel dam, that is based on 
prior zoning activity fails. The court finds that the county became reasonably concerned about the 
general suitability of the area for building and properly acted under its pohce power to protect the 
public health and safety. The County acted under a Statute that authorized ,ts conduct. The fact 
that prior regulations and/or approval existed or were made merely reinforces .he legitimacy of 
the conclusion that an emergency moratorium was required until further study was complete. 
There is some evidence that defendants Wright and Mathis made representations shortly 
before the first moratorium that some individual plaindffs had property suitable for building and 
.hat there would be no problems Generally, estoppel cannot be asserted against a government 
agency unless spectal circumstances exist. These special circumstances have been defined by the 
Utah Court of Appeals as: 
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where the interests of justice mandate an exception 10 the genera: rule In cases 
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry' is whether it appears tna: the facts 
may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient 
gravity, to invoke the exception And in case there is doubt on such manei~s5 it 
should be resolved in favor of permitting the part}' to have a trial of the issue, as 
opposed to summary rejection thereof Ehiers & Ehlers Architects v Carbon 
County. 805 P.2d 789 at 792 (Utah App 1993) 
The Court is unable, on the state of the record at this time, to determine if the interests of 
justice would mandate application of the doctrine in this case Summary judgment on this point 
must be denied. 
As far as a declarator}7 judgment that the moratoria are no longer in effect, the court 
considers that issue to be moot. From the number of permits issued since this case began, it is 
evident that no moratorium remains Both Ordinances have expired and are no longer being 
enforced. 
Fifth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs assert that there was inadequate notice before the adoption of Ordinances 
97-1 and 97-13. amounting to a deprivation of substantive and procedural due process under the 
United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs also assert that equal protection rights were violated. 
This equal protection claim does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect class. This 
requires the court to apply the rational basis test, Tonkovich v Kansas Board of Regents. 159 
F.3rd 504 at 532 (10th Cir., 1998) The standard is whether there is "any reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification/5 See F.C C v Beach 
Communications. Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). The court finds that the classification had a rational 
basis based on concerns of the Plaintiffs, other concerns about slope stability, and septic tank 
suitability. The Equal Protection claim fails as a matter of law. 
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The next claim of substantive due process \aolation also fails Tms claim also requires the 
coun to apply the rational basis test See Smith Inv Co v Sandv City, 95 P P 2d 24 f (TJt Ct 
199S) The coun has already held tha: there was a rational basis for the ordinances in question 
The Substantive Due Process claim fails as a matter of law. 
The Procedural Due Process Claim also fails as a marter of law The coun finds that the 
required notice was given for Ordinance 97-13 and that Ordinance 97-1 did not require a hearing 
as it was passed under the authority of U.C.A 17-27-404 It appears that this procedural due 
process claim actually challenges the statue that authorizes a temporary7 ordinance to be passed 
without notice. The statute sets forth the narrow findings that must be made to justify such an 
ordinance. The required compelling government interest overcomes the notice requirement of 
procedural due process Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to cause bf 
action 5. 
Sixth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs claim that the ordinances violated U.C.A §17-27-404 because they 
purported to be effective for longer than 6 months. 
The coun finds that 97-1 expired by its terms within six months. There is a question of 
fact as to when ordinance 97-13 actually expired and the court will reserve a finding on that until 
it can hear all of the evidence and give it appropriate weight. Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is granted on this cause of action with regard to the validity of Ordinance 97-1 but 
denied with regard to Ordinance 97-13. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied as to 
the sixth cause of action. 
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Seventh Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs assert that Ordinances 97-1 and 97-13 violate U C A £17-27-404 in that 
there was no compelling countervailing public interest 
The court finds that summary judgment ma}' be granted to Defendants on this cause of 
action The Count)7 Commission did make the required findings which are included within the 
Ordinances themselves Given the deference5 that the court must give to legislative findings, the 
court finds that there was sufficient basis for the count)' to find that a compelling countervailing 
public interest existed at the time that the ordinances were enacted 
Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action 
The Plaintiffs allege in these two causes of action that they were harmed because of a 
representation by a County Attorney that Ordinance 97-13 was effective made on August 113 
1997 before actual publication of the Ordinance and that County Officials subsequently enforced 
the Ordinance by denying certain Plaintiffs building permits before the Ordinance took effect 
The court finds that it was improper for the county attorneys to declare the ordinance 
effective before its publication date. Ordinance 97-13 could not have been effective until it wTas 
published in November of 1997. The evidence presented to the Court on this point does indicate 
that no application for permits were received after August 11, 1997 until August 24, 1998. More 
significantly, the Plaintiffs have not alleged any legal theory or basis for recovery7 from the 
misstatement of law or enforcement, if it occurred at all, of the not yet valid Ordinance They 
merely claim "equitable relief" The Court is unaware of any legal basis for such relief and, in any 
5
 See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City7 of Springville, (1999) for a 
discussion of deference to legislative findings. 
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event, ii unwilling to supph' a basis not plead. Summary judgmen: foT trie Defendants on this 
point is appropriate. 
Tenth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs allege that Ordinance 97-13 was improperly adopted because a study 
required by Ordinance 97-1 was inadequate. 
The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action The 
court finds that there were sufficient facts to support the findings of the legislature 
notwithstanding an incomplete report, if it w?as, in fact, incomplete. The court again notes the 
deference the court is required to give to legislative findings. 
Eleventh Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs allege that the County and the Health Department of the County7 committed 
trespass by drilling and periodically inspecting monitoring wells on the subject property to 
monitor groundwater. The Plaintiffs want damages from the trespass and an injunction to prohibit 
further intrusion. 
The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action. 
Declaratory relief is not available under the law7 for the tort of trespass. The Statute is UCA 
§78-33-2, which reads as follows: 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or w7hose rights, status 
or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or 
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under 
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
Plaintiffs complain of an intentional tort not their rights under the ordinances that they question, 
nor do they challenge the validity of any ordinance that allows the trespass to occur. This cause 
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of actior simplj does no: lend itself to relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act 
The remaining issue for an injunction also fails as a matter of law The coun finds that it 
would be adverse to the public interest for the State not to be able to monitor ground water levels 
in this area The Health Department is permitted to inspect the wells according to U C.A. 58-56-
°w-
Twelfth Cause of Action 
The Plaintiffs assert that the County committed the tort of interference with economic 
relations by the enactment of the Ordinances 
The coun finds that the government has not waived immunity for this cause of action 6 
The court also finds that there was no prohibition on sales contained in ordinance 97-13. Part 5 
of the ordinance merely prohibits sales in the Canyon Meadows area with a concurrent 
representation by the seller that building would be allowed This same provision also requires an 
express reference to the ordinance with each sale of land. These provisions are not prohibitions 
on the sale of property The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this 
cause of action. 
Thirteenth Cause of Action 
Plaintiffs assert that Resolution 99-11 infringes upon their constitutional rights by 
requiring County officials and employees to direct all inquiries regarding matters under litigation 
to the County Attorney. 
The coun finds that this resolution does not infringe upon constitutional rights nor does it 
violate state law. The county legislators have merely assigned control over who disseminates 
6
 SeeU.CA 63-30-10(2) 
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litigation information to the department bes: able to do so. The court finds that there is no basis 
in fact to conclude that Defendants are depriving Plaintiffs of any of their rights through this 
resolution The court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action 
Fourteenth Cause of Action 
Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against the County Commissioners and Defendants 
Mathis and Wright The Court has already concluded that the actions of the Commissioners were 
protected by absolute immunity as noted above. No damages of any sort can be assessed against 
those Defendants. 
The court finds that there is a question of fact as to whether punitive damages may be 
appropriate against Defendants Mathis and Wright. 
Summary 
There are parts of four causes of action left to try. From the second cause of action, 
Plaintiffs' 42 USC §1983 claim against Defendants Mathis and Wright must be determined with 
the receipt of evidence. From the fourth cause of action, the zoning estoppel claim based on 
representations made by Defendants Mathis and Wright as to property purchasers' ability to get a 
building permit cannot be resolved without evidence. From the sixth cause of action, the issue of 
whether Ordinance 97-13 lasted longer than six months in violation of U.C A §17-27-404, 
resulting in some harm to the Plaintiflfs will require evidence. Finally, from the fourteenth cause of 
action, whether punitive damages are appropriate against Defendants Mathis and Wright must 
also be determined following the receipt of evidence All other causes of action are resolved by 
summary judgment as noted above. Counsel for the Defendants is directed to prepare an 
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appropnate order in accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration 
Dated this ^ day of July, 2001 
Copies of this Decision mailed to 
Counsel for the Plaintiff 
__ 
JudgeJamesR. Taylor _ 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Gordon Duval 
Brian K Haws 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Counsel for the Defendant 
Craig V Wentz 
50 South Main Street, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
± Mailed this ^ day of July, 2001, postage pre-paid as noted above 
Tx^v X<J<JLS\ 
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In sum, Your Honor, the county would be 
extraordinarily prejudiced at the 11th hour if plaintiffs at 
the 11th hour were allowed to amend. And we would have to 
basically take a, another six or seven or eight months on 
the, on the damage issues. We have a pretty good idea of who 
we want to depose on the damage issues, who was affected by 
the moratoria that were adopted, that were terminated, by the 
way, way back in 1998, and who was not. 
Plaintiffs are essentially proposing that because 
they slumbered on their rights or on their duties to name 
John Does that we now add another layer of complexity on to 
this case when its virtually over, Your Honor. 
That's the end of my argument. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Mr. Haws? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. HAWS 
MR. HAWS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, I appreciate Mr. Wentz giving the 
history of this case because it's important to what's going 
on. Mr. Wentz refers to five years of litigation. It will 
be eight years in a — 
THE JUDGE: Well let's be, let's be honest. 
MR. HAWS: I, let's... Let me go through the 
history. 
THE JUDGE: I'm only talking, I'm only talking 




























MR. HAWS: But, Your Honor, you need to 
understand the history of that. 
THE JUDGE: I understand that— 
MR. HAWS: Because what happened is... Sorry 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: One of us at a time and I'm talking 
right now. 
MR. HAWS: I appreciate that, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I do understand that there is much 
history before this lawsuit was filed. But I only can deal 
with a lawsuit that was filed in '99. So I just want to make 
sure you understand that I only have authority to deal with a 
lawsuit. 
MR. HAWS: I understand that completely, 
Your Honor. And so I will jump to this lawsuit. 
Mr. Wentz argues that what happened in the federal 
case has to be excluded here because it's a different case 
and you only have one case before you. It is a different 
case. 
But, Your Honor, if you will look, in the 
-plaintiff, excuse me, in the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment they submit, sorry, I have the wrong book, in 
Exhibit C is the deposition of Vic Orvis (phonetic) taken and 
presented in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah for the federal court. Exhibit D is a 
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deposition of Bob Mathis in that court. Exhibit H is the 
exhibit of D. Olsen. Your Honor, they go on and on. These 
depositions have always been used in a, in this case. 
When it was brought back the, the county 
stipulated that everything would relate back to the original 
filing date of 1997, everything... As a matter of fact if 
you look through, if you glance through the, the file, which 
is an all day task, you will see that there are no first set 
of discovery, second set of discovery, those are in the 
federal case. We went through two years of litigation in 
the federal case when Mr. Wentz said oh, you know what, 
found this lawsuit, I mean this case that came down says it's 
not ripe until it goes through the state court. We agreed 
that we would not go back and redo depositions, redo 
discovery. It's the same matter. 
And for him to now stand up and argue, after 
relying on these depositions and relying on this discovery 
that took place in the federal case in his motion for 
summary judgment which he points out he prevailed on 
several of the points, for him to argue that now we can't 
look back at that discovery, that's just simply 
disingenuous. 
THE JUDGE: I think you can look back at that 




The Utah Zoning Enabling Acts: 
Suggestions for Change 
By Richard S. Dale bo Lit 
L INTRODUCTION 
Zoning Enabling Acts 
In 1991, the .Utah State Legislature 
enacted The Municipal Land Use Devel-
opment and Management Act (the "City 
Act1'), and its county cousin, The County 
Land Use Development and Management 
Act (the "County Act"). These acts are the 
only comprehensive revision of Utah zon-
ing enabling law since the adoption of the 
first zoning enabling law for cities in 
1925, and the first zoning enabling law for 
counties in 1941. 
Adoption of these two acts accom-
plished at least the following: (1) the 
former enabling statutes were comprehen-
sively reorganized and placed in logical 
order; (2) the enabling statutes for cities 
and counties were placed in similar lan-
guage and format; and, (3) many —. but 
certainly not all — obsolete provisions of 
the previous enabling acts were eliminated. 
Understanding political realities, it is 
something of a secular miracle that so 
much common ground was found, and the 
two acts adopted. But, those who were 
involved in that process freely admit what 
is obvious, that there are some loose 
pieces. They acknowledge that there are 
some provisions of the two acts which 
need refining. This article focuses on that 
refining process. 
Thumbnail Sketch 
Before proceeding, a thumbnail sketch j 
of zoning law is in order for those not 
actively involved with the subject. Zoning 
is the process of dividing land into dis-
tricts and regulating its use. This is done 
by cities and counties, which are con-
trolled in tht process by the provisions of 
the City Act and the County Act. A city or 
count}' planning commission prepares a | 
long-range plan called a general plan, and 
also a proposed zoning ordinance (includ-
ing text and a map) which is based on the 
general plan. The legislative body reviews 
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Dalebout, Utah Zoning Law and Pro-
posals for Legislative Change, 9 BYU J. 
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and amends these documents, and then 
adopts the zoning ordinance into law. The 
zoning ordinance permits some land "uses" 
outright, and others are made conditional in 
various ways. 
The zoning ordinance is administered by 
city or county staff and the planning com-
mission. Disputes arising in the process of 
zoning administration, and requests for 
"variances," are decided by a board of 
adjustment. Dissatisfied parties may appeal 
to the courts. 
Issues to be Resolved 
The provisions of the new enabling acts 
which need attention range from those 
which are relatively minor to those which 
are very important. Following is a list of 
those matters, each cast in the form of an 
I issue. After the list, each of the issues is 
briefly discussed and a suggestion for 
change is given. The issues are as follows: 
The Planning Commission. 
• Should a p lanning commission be 
required? 
• Should local government be allowed to 
d e c i d e the n u m b e r of p l a n n i n g 
commission members and the length of 
their term? 
• Should the chair of a planning commis-
sion be hmited to a one year term? 
The Zoning Ordinance. 
• Should a general plan be approved 
before a zoning ordinance is enacted? 
| • Should'the legal basis for refusing to 
allow the use of initiatives and refer-
enda to rezone be reconsidered? 
• Should a planning commission recom-
mendation be required before a six-
month "moratorium" is enacted? 
Subdivisions. 
• Should divisions of land for agricul-
tural, commercial, manufacturing or 
industrial purposes be exempt from 
subdivision control? 
Board of Adjustment. 
• What should the number of members of 
a board of adjustment be, and what 
should their voting requirements be? 
• How many days should be allowed to 
a p p e a l a d e c i s i o n to a board of 
adjustment? 
• Should a board of adjustment have 
jurisdiction to interpret a zoning map? 
• Wha t is the mean ing of "specia l 
exception"? 
• Should a board of adjustment have I 
exclusive jurisdiction over special 
exception appeals? 
• Should a board of adjustment have 
exclusive jurisdiction over conditional 
use permit appeals? 
Appeals. 
• Should calculation of the time to appeal 
to the courts from a board of adjust-
20 Vol. 8 No. 3 
ment decision commence when the 
board's "decision is rendered,'1 or when 
the board's "decision is final"'7 
n . THE ISSUES 
BRIEFLY DISCUSSED 
Following is a buef discussion of each 
of the issues described above Included 
with the discussion of each issue is a sug-
gestion describing how the issue may be 
resolved. 
Planning Commission Required? 
Should a planning commission be 
required9 The enabling acts provide that 
cihQ^ and counties "may" create a plan-
ning commission ' But, it is clear that 
zoning cannot be accomplished without a 
planning commission Necessary functions 
hkt the creation of a general plan, recom-
mending a zoning ordinance and 
amendments thereto, as well as recom-
mending a subdivision ordinance and 
amendments thereto, cannot be accom-
plished without a planning commission. 
Suggested Change. Although it is a 
relatively minor point, the acts should pro-
vide — as they do with board of 
adjustment — that cities and counnes shall 
create a planning commission 
Number and Term of Planning Commis-
sion Members. 
Should local government be allowed to 
decide the number of planning commission 
members and the length of their term9 The 
Cit^ Act allows the local legislative body to 
decide the number and terms of planning 
commission members - In contrast, the 
County Act proscribes a planning comrms-
sion of seven members serving three-year 
terms' There is, no obvious reason for this 
difference, except that is the way it was 
done m the past. 
Suggested Change. In the absence of a 
reason for being restrictive, the Count}' Act 
should be amended to provide that iht county 
legislative body may decide the number and 
terms of planning commission members. 
Term of Planning Commission Chair. 
Should the chair of a planmng commis-
sion be limited to a one year term 9 In 
general, both acts provide that a planning 
commission may establish its own policies 
and procedures, but the legislative body 
may control those policies and procedures 
by ordinance or otherwise - Silhouetted 
against this general policy is an old provi-
sion earned forward into the Count}' Act, 
that a planning commission chair may 
serve only a one-year term5 
Suggested Change. The ability to reg-
ulate the term of the commission chair is 
contained m the power to control policies 
and procedures, the one-year piovision is 
a duplication and unnecessarily restrictive 
and should be repealed. 
General Plan Before Zoning Ordinance. 
Should a general plan be approved 
before a zoning ordinance is enacted9 If a 
zoning ordinance is the specific imple-
mentation of the long-range forecast of a 
oeneral plan,6 it seems reasonable to 
require that approval of the general plan 
precede adoption of the zomng ordinance 
However, neither act so requires and in 
Oayland ^ Salt Lake County (1961V the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the prior 
county enabling act did not so require 
Suggested Change. Both acts should 
be amended 10 require the adoption of a 




Telephone conference with. 
physician specialists for 
case merit evaluation 
Medical Reviews 
Written review of medical 
records by experienced 
physician specialists 
• / ^ . n l t a t i on • Medical records review 
(801)261-3003 • J ^ ^ t U P , HflEDlCAD 
HIPINIONS 
670 East 3900 South Ste.300. SLC, UT 84107 
21 
March 1995 
Initiatives and Referenda to Rezone. 
Should the legal basis for refusing to 
allow the use of initiatives and referenda 
to rezone be reconsidered? In the absence 
of legislative direction, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held — most recently in Citi-
zen 's Awareness Now v. Marakis* — that 
routine rezomng amendments ma}' not be 
decided by popular vote. The wisdom of 
that policy is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. The point here is that the policy is 
based on the strained reasoning that rou-
tine zoning amendments, although cast in 
the form of a legislative act, are in sub-
stance an administrative decision; thus, 
initiatives and referenda cannot be used 
{'in a non-legislative context). This reason-
ing obviously flies in the face of other Utah 
decisions which uniformly hold that the 
process of adopting zoning regulations is a 
legislative function.9 
Suggested Change. The city and count}' 
enabling acts should be amended to accept 
or reject the policy that routine zoning 
amendments may not be decided b}' popular 
vote. Whatever that decision, the result will 
be to place the policy on a statutory basis 
and thereby eliminate the need for the 
unsatisfactory administrative-legislative 
dichotomy described in Mar alas. 
Planning Commission Recommendation 
for a Moratorium. 
Should a planning commission recom-
mendation be required before a six-month 
Grant Thornton 
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"moratorium" is enacted? A local legisla-
tive body ma} enact temporary zoning 
legislation (a moratorium) which prohibits 
land development for up to six months.10 
Such a provision is often used to respond 
to quickly-developing problems, but the 
enabling acts do not waive the require-
ment that a planning commission 
recommendation precede the enactment of 
zoning legislation. Indeed, the acts are 
explicit that an amendment to the text or 
map of a zoning ordinance first requires 
referral to the planning commission." 
Suggested Change. Both enabling acts 
should be amended to make clear that 
enactment of temporary zoning legislation 
does not require a prior referral to the 
planning commission. 
Divis ions of L a n d and Subdivis ion 
Control. 
Should divisions of land for agricul-
tural , commercia l , manufacturing or 
industrial purposes be exempt from subdi-
vision control? Under the City Act, 
divisions of land for these purposes may 
be controlled by a subdivision ordinance, | 
but under the County Act they may not,12 
These land divisions, particularly the sub-
dividing of land for commercial , 
maiiiifacniririg or industrial purposes, nor-
mal ly create problems in relation to 
Transportation, sewer, water, power, and 
the like. 
Suggested Change. The County Act 
should be amended to make subdivisions 
of land for agricultural, commercial, man-
ufacturing or industrial purposes subject to 
a county7 subdivision ordinance. 
Number of Board Adjustment Members. 
What should the number of members of 
a board of adjustment be, and what should 
their voting requirements be? A city board 
of adjustment has five members,13 and 
operates by majority vote.14 In contrast, a 
county board of adjustment has "three to | 
five" members.15 Although a literal read-
ing of the "three to five'3 language allows 
a four-member county board, voting pro-
cedures are given only for three-member 
and five-member boards, implying that an 
odd number is intended.16 Three members 
is such a small number that such a board is 
required to act by unanimous vote.p A 
three-member board with a unanimous 
voting requirement has great potential for 
unfairness, because any one person can 
block action by the board. 
Suggested Change. The County Act 
22 
should be amended to eliminate three-
member boards of adjustment with a 
unanimous voting requirement 
Time to Appeal to a Board of Adjustment 
How many days should be allowed to 
appeal a decision to a board of adjust-
ment? Both acts provide that local zoning 
ordinances shall describe "a reasonable 
time" within which to appeal a matter to a 
board of adjustment.If! But, it is a harsh 
reality that many local zoning ordinances 
are in a state of disrepair and may not 
describe a reasonable time to appeal. The 
time allowed to appeal is a procedural rule 
that is often in play; if it is not described, 
unnecessary jurisdictional problems 
may recur. 
Suggested Change. The City Act and 
the County Act should be amended to pro-
vide that appeals shall be taken to the 
board of adjustment within ten days of the 
action from which an appeal is taken, 
unless the local zoning ordinance provides 
a different reasonable rime period. 
Board of Adjustment Interpretation of 
the Zoning Map. 
Should a board of adjustment have juris-
diction to interpret a zoning map? In 
general, a board of adjustment has power to 
review all administrative decisions. But, in 
another carry-over from the past, the 
County Act provides that a county board of 
adjustment may not ''interpret the zoning 
maps and pass upon disputed questions of 
lot lines, district boundary lines, or similar 
questions" unless specially authorized in the 
zoning ordinance.19 Interpretation of a zon-
ing map appears to be an unremarkable 
thing for a board of adjustment to do, and no 
different in relative importance than other 
things a board does. 
Suggested Change . The County Act 
should be amended to repeal the require-
ment that a county board of adjustment 
must have special authorization in tht zon-
ing ordinance to "interpret the zoning maps 
and pass upon disputed questions of lot 
lines, district boundary lines, or similar 
questions." 
Meaning of "Special Exception." 
What is the meaning of the term "spe-
cial exception"? This term is first found in 
the original 1925 city enabling act and it 
is used" in both of the present acts,20 but it 
is not defined in any of those places. Most 
authorities say that a "special exception1 
is the same as a "conditional use permit, -' 
and in Thurston v. Cache County (1981)" 
the Utah Supreme Court was willing to 
assume, arguendo, that some "'special 
exceptions* aie conditional use permits. 
The point is of concern because the acts 
treat "special exception" and "conditional 
rise permit" separately for purposes of 
board adjustment jurisdiction. 
Suggested Change. A simple solution 
is to have the acts provide that a condi-
tional use permit, and other forms of 
conditional land uses are types of special 
exception. This solution clarifies the rela-
tionship between the two terms, and also 
allows local governments to create other 
types of special exceptions as circum-
stances require. 
A NEW PARTNERSHIP. 
iu„t ,he N 2 ^ ^ has recently 
Liability Insurance Program. 
mffis ,\ rated "A" by AM. Best and brings 20 years 
ffofM Uabity insurance knowledge and 
experience to the Utah program. 
Call us for details— ROLUNSHVDIGHALL 
Program Administrator 1O1 over „
 3 
2180 South 1 ^ 0 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, ITT 84106 
(801) 48S-2550 / (800) 759-2001 
March 1995 
Board of Adjustment Jurisdiction over 
Special Exceptions. 
Should a board of adjustment have 
exclusive jurisdiction over special excep-
tion appeals7 Because the acts treat special 
exceptions and conditional use permits as 
separate concepts, the acts must have sep-
arate provisions for appeals to a board of 
adjustment In cities and counties, jurisdic-
tion of a board of adjustment over special 
exceptions is inconsistently described in 
three different ways (1) "[t]he board of 
adjustment shall hear and decide spe-
cial exceptions to the terms of the zoning 
ordinance",23 (2) "[i]n enacting the zoning 
ordinance, the legislative body may 
grant jurisdiction to the board of adjust-
ment to hear and decide some or all 
special exceptions,"*' and, (3) "[t]he t ici 
of adjustment may hear and decide p c u l 
exceptions onl} if authorized to do sc b the 
zoning ordinance *,2S 
Suggested Change. The Cny A and 
the County Act should be amended ic ci\t 
the legislative bod} discretion to deiemuut 
the extent of the board of adjustment iu i 
diction over special exceptions 
Board of Adjustment Jurisdiction o\tr 
Conditional Use Permits. 
Should a board of adjustment lu \ t 
exclusive jurisdiction over conditiona u.t 
permit appeals'? Suppose a city recent m 
application for a conditional use perron ro 
build a convemence store Who gets tin last 
word on the issuance or terms of the permit 
will it be the board of adjustment o the 
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jrom planning commission dec swns 
regarding conditional use permits unless 
the zoning ordinance designates anothei 
bod) to hear conditional use permit 
appeals' This provision contemplates of 
course that the planning commission Vvill 
make d conditional use permit decision 
which — as the at} council decides m its 
zoning ordmance — will then be appealed 
to the board of adjustment or to another 
bod} which would likel} be the cit} coun-
cil But, what if — as occurs m at least 
one city m Utah — tht original condi 
tional use permit decision is made b} the 
city council and not the planning commis-
sion9 In such a case the city council must 
allow the board of adjustment the last 
word on appeal which is contrary to the 
objective of the statute 
Suggested Change The City Act and 
County Act should be amended (1) to pro 
vide that a conditional use permit and 
other forms of conditional uses are types 
of special exceptions, as discussed above, 
and (2) b} clarifying the provisions thar 
allov tht zoning ordinance to route condi-
tional use appeals to the board of 
adjustment or another body 
Time to Appeal to the Courts 
Should calculation of the time to appeal 
to the courts from a board of adjustment 
decision commence when the board's 
'decision is r e n d e r e d ' or Vvhen the 
board s decision is final0 The City Act 
and the County Act inadvertent!} describe 
appeals to the courts in two different pro-
\ is ions One section provides that 
calculation of the time to appeal com 
mences when the board 's decision is 
rendered '"7 The other section provides 
that calculation of the time to appeal com 
mences when the board 's ' decision is 
final "28 Experienced practitioners will rec 
ogmze that, m some cases the time a 
decision is rendered may not be the time a 
decision is final 
Suggested Change The City Act and the 
County Act should be amended to consoli-
date within each of those acts the proMSions 
on appeals to the courts Calculation of the 
time to appeal to the courts should com 
mence at the time a decision is final 
m CONCLUSION 
It i«? important to sav again that it is 
something like a secular miracle that trie 
authors and sponsors of The Municipal 
Land Use Development and Management 
Act and The County Land Use Develop 
ment and Management Act were able to 
find the common ground on which enact 
ment was based Perhaps onl} those who 
practiced law undei the provisions of the 
earlier enabling statutes understand how 
much is accomplished in these two acts 
"These suggestions should nor he 
feared M cities and counties with 
fixed views about how a zoning 
system should operate " 
It is nevertheless true that some refine 
ment of the two acts remains examples of 
which are the issues and suggestions above 
These suggestions should not be feared by 
cities or counties with fixed views about 
how a zoning system should operate 
because, in nearh every situation, the sug-
gested changes eliminate restraints and 
allow the local legislative bod} to structure 
a zoning according to local choice 
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5Urah Code Anr g 10 9 201 (1) (a) and 6 17 2" 201 (1) (a) 
^UtahCoO Ann 6 10 ^ 2 C and § 1 "7 202 
^Uiah Code Ann 6 P *> 202 (J) fb; 
f>See e t, Utah Cod- ^nn <i 10 9 301 and 5 T 27 301 
7358P2d63j 
&BT3P2d I I P 
9 £ ^ Chevro Oil Compun \ Beaver Count) 449 P 2d 
989 (Utah 1969) 
%tah Cod Anr fc 10 9 404 and § 17 27-404 
1 lutah Code Ann § 10 9-40^ (1) (a) and § 17 ^7-403 (lj 
(a) 
l^Utah Code Ann * 10 9 103 (qj (iij (B) and § 17 27 lib 
(q)0'i) 
13U l a h Code Ann H 0 - c 701 (2) 
l^Utal Code Ann s 10 9 702 (5) 
15rjrah Code Ann i 10 9 201 (1) (a) and § 17 27 201 (1) 
(a) 
^utah Code Ann {, 17 27 70^ (:>) 
"id 
ISutab Code Ann § 10-9 704 (1) (a) (ii) and § 17 V 704 
(1)(a)(n) 
l^Utah Code Ann § T 27 703 (3) 
2 0 £ £ Utah Code Anr § 10 9 706 (1) (a) and & 17 27 70o 
(iHa) 
21
 See eg 6 Patncl J Rohan Zoning and Land Use Con 
trols 44 01(1) (19r2 ( Different terms hav- been applied to 
special permit, special exceptions and conditional uses 
but me consensus of judicial opinion is that the) all refer 
io the same concept and are therefore interchange 
able ) 
2202DP2d440 
2^Utah Code Ann § 10 9 703 (1) (b) mid § 17 27 703 (1) 
(b) 
24U t a h Code Ann § 1 9 706 (1) (b) and §17 2" 70o (lj (b) 
^Utah Cod- Ann § 10 9 70o (2> ano £ 17 27 706 (2; 
26 U m h Code Anr £ 10 9-407 (2j § 10-9 704 (2) § 10 9 
70o (3) and § T 27 70o (3) 
27U u J 1 Cod Ann E 10 Q 1001 H and 6 P 27 1D01 (2) 







(ft eber, Dam, Morgan Counties) 
I would sincerely appreciate your vote, 
25 
Morc/i 1995 
